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INTRODUCTION
The published judicial opinion' is the "heart of the common law
system."2 Judicial opinions are a critical component of what we
understand to be the "law."' In fact, a legal system's existence cannot
be recognized "until the decisions of [its] courts are regularly
published and are available to the bench and bar."4 To the extent
our "law" is embodied in precedents, published opinions are the
authoritative sources of law. Indeed, stare decisis cannot operate in
the absence of published opinions.5 Opinions "are what courts do,
notjust what they say[;] [t]hey are the substance ofjudicial action."6
Courts ensure the legitimacy of their decisions by preparing and
1. An "opinion" is a "statement by ajudge or court of the decision reached in regard to
a cause tried or argued before them, expounding the law as applied to the case, and detailing
the reasons upon which thejudgment is based." BLACK'S LAW DIrlONARY 1092 (6th ed. 1990).
Some courts adopt a similar, albeit narrower, definition of opinion. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, distinguishes opinions from memoranda and orders. 9TH CIR. R. 36-1 (stating that
court may enter order with or without written opinion). This Article adopts Black's definition.
The term "opinion" implies nothing about the dissemination of the document. Opinions may
be published or unpublished, and unpublished opinions may or may not be precedential. See
infra Part IA. Thus, at times this Article distinguishes between preparation of an opinion (as
opposed to some other type of document) and publication or nonpublication of the opinion.
Opinion preparation and publication each serve important but distinct purposes.
Black's defines "decision" to mean a "determination arrived at after consideration of facts, and
in legal contexts, law." BLACK'S LAW DIaIONARY, supra, at 407. This Article uses "decision" to
refer generically to court actions resolving the disputes before them, whether or not by opinion.
It uses "disposition" to refer to decisions without opinions.
2. John Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 59,
59 (1963) (calling opinions the working tool of lawyers, and building blocks ofjudges). This
Article uses "common law" to describe adjudication that employs reference to prior decisions
and reasoning by analogy as its primary tools. Similarly,Judge Richard Posner uses the phrase
'common law" broadly "to mean any body of law created primarily by judges through their
decisions ... even if not by common law judges in the strict sense lawyers employ." RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247 (1990); see also infra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text (discussing federal courts as common-law-style tribunals that rely on
precedent to guide decisionmaking).
3. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
723, 748 (1988) (discussing stare decisis and its role in providing stability and continuity in
judicial decisions).
4. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 9 (1977).
5. See infra Part II.B (discussing importance of courts citing cases to show nature of law and
precedent).
6. Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations ConcerningJudicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810,
819 (1961).
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publishing opinions that explain and justify their reasoning. And
judges and lawyers are utterly dependent upon published opinions to
research, evaluate, argue, and decide cases-the most basic of legal
tasks.
Yet over the past two decades, the federal courts of appeals have
regularly employed practices that reduce the roles and uses of
published judicial opinions.7 This Article examines three of those
practices: selective publication, summary disposition, and vacatur
upon settlement. Part I describes each practice.
Part I establishes the critical importance of federal courts of
appeals' opinions. After reviewing the manner in which the law
develops through case-by-case adjudication, Part II examines the close
connection between the history of opinion publication and the
doctrine of stare decisis. Next, it defines five core values-stability,
certainty, predictability, consistency, and fidelity to authority-that are
prerequisites to a legitimate legal system, and suggests ways in which
published opinions facilitate the operation of these core values in a
system where law develops through adjudication. Finally, Part II
examines the role of opinions as essential tools in the two main
activities of lawyers and judges: researching and applying the law.
7. These changes in appellate court practices are directly related to burgeoning caseloads.
During the year ending September 30, 1993, there were 50,224 filings and 167judgeships in the
courts of appeals. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTs, Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
3 tbl. 1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT] (advance copy on file with the Author). In
1970, there were 11,662 filings and 97judgeships. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 99 (tbl. 2)
(1971). Thus, from 1970 to 1993, filings increased by 330% while judgeships increased only
72%.
For analysis of the caseload crisis and suggestions for reform, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL Cr.,
STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (1993)
(reporting that caseload crisis has led to insufficient time to deliberate over cases, diminished
quality of appellate process, and inconsistent interpretations of federal law); id. at 105-22
(suggesting full structural changes in appellate process); id. at 123-39 (proposing alternatives to
full structural changes); FEDERAL CTS. STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 5, 109-31 (1990) (stating that
caseload crisis is due mainly to increase in appeals from district courts, and recommending
increase in judgeships and remodeling of appellate courts); Alan Betten, Institutional Reform in
the Federal Courts, 52 IND. LJ. 63, 64 (1976) (attributing caseload crisis to sharp increase in
criminal appeals); Arthur D. Hellman, The Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the Browning
Years, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 7 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (discussing steps taken by Ninth
Circuit to handle burdensome caseload, including increase in judges, performance of en banc
functions with less than full court, and formation of elaborate case inventory system); id. at 68-
122 (recommending ways to make appellate process more efficient); see also THOMAS E. BAKER,
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 230 (1994)
(suggesting adoption of certiorari-like system; replacement of current circuit system with
alternative structure; or keeping present system but employing modifications adopted by Ninth
Circuit).
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Part III uses recent cases to illustrate how selective publication,
summary disposition, and vacatur upon settlement impede the
development of a coherent body of decisional law, frustrate lawyers
and judges in performing their daily tasks, and threaten the legitimacy
of the federal courts. This Article concludes that while efficiency is
a proper concern, the courts of appeals currently overvalue it at the
expense of the broader purposes they must serve in our legal system.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that federal courts of appeals
should (1) operate under presumptions favoring publication, (2)
develop broader awareness of the many uses of precedent, and (3)
publish full opinions in cases where they reverse the lower court
decision or fail to reach a unanimous decision.
I. PRACTICES REDUCING THE ROLE OF THE OPINION
Selective publication, summary disposition, and vacatur upon
settlement undermine the notion that the "law," as enunciated by
courts, can be found by researching published opinions. These
practices challenge fundamental assumptions of lawyers and judges:
that the law is findable, that the precedential value of a decision is
readily ascertainable, and that past decisions provide sufficient
information to guide citizens, attorneys, and judges in the future.
Indeed, the United States' appellate tradition "contemplates such a
central role for the published opinion that to have a two-tracked
system is to have a different system" than the one we claim to have.'
A. Selective Publication
Selective publication describes the federal courts of appeals'
concerted effort in recent years to reduce their opinion publication
rates.9 Unpublished opinions are common: the courts of appeals
issued more than 10,000 unpublished opinions in 1993 alone.1"
8. BAKER, supra note 7, at 130.
9. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577-79 (1981)
(discussing movement initiated by Judicial Conference of United States in 1964 to reduce
number of published circuit court opinions); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of theDisposable Opinion:
Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 940, 940 (1989) (stating that by 1976, all circuit courts limited publication of opinions by
rule).
10. The courts of appeals terminated 47,790 appeals during statistical year 1993. 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, tbls. B-1, B-2; see also infra note 48. Of these, 25,761 (54%) were
terminations on the merits. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, tbl. B-1.
I ran a search to determine how many unpublished federal appeals court dispositions
appeared on Westlaw for the year 1993. This search yielded 17,100 documents. I also searched
for summary dispositions, and found 6248 such actions in 1993. See infra note 19. Subtracting
6248 summary dispositions from the 17,100 unpublished documents results in 10,852 documents.
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Serious interest in selective publication dates back at least thirty years.
In 1964, theJudicial Conference of the United States issued a general
recommendation that judges publish only those opinions "which are
of general precedential value."" Within several years,12 each circuit
had adopted a rule regarding publication of opinions and citation of
unpublished opinions.3 In the twenty years since those rules were
adopted, the percentage of opinions published has declined.1 4
I assume that, in these cases, opinions were written but not published. Additional unpublished
opinions may exist because some circuits do not provide unpublished opinions to LEXIS and
Westlaw. See Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law: A Proposal
for the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth
Circui 31 WASHBURN LJ. 155, 158 n.15 (1992) (stating that as of 1990, half of all federal circuit
courts had not made their unpublished opinions available to LEXIS or Westlaw); see alsoJudith
Resnik, WhoseJudgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication
at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L REV. 1471, 1498 n.97 (1994) (describing how
LEXIS and Westlaw handle opinions designated "not for publication").
11. U.S. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORTS 1962-64, at 11
(1964).
12. During this time, the Federal Judicial Center completed a study of the circuit courts'
publication practices. Board of the Fed.Judicial Ctr., Recommendation and Report to the April
1972 Meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States 4-7 (1972) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Office of the Judicial Conference Secretariat, Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts) (reporting on publication of court of appeals opinions and recommending
reduction in number of opinions published); see also Donald R. Songer et al., Nonpublication in
the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963, 965 (1989) (finding that
circuit courts' publication practices varied).
13. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R 11(c) (stating that its unpublished decisions can be cited only for
preclusive effect, and other courts' unpublished dispositions are allowed only if originating
jurisdiction gives them precedential status), 14 (listing criteria for publication); 1ST CIR. R. 36.2
(giving guidelines for publication and allowing citation of unpublished opinions only in related
cases); 2D CIR. L 0.23 (stating that unanimous decisions will not be published if all judges on
panel agree that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by written opinion); 3D CIR. I.O.P.
5.5 to .6 (stating that precedential or institutional value is prerequisite to publication, and
disallowing citation of unpublished opinions as precedent); 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.4 to .6 (listing
standards for publication and allowing citation of unpublished opinions only in rare cases and
for resjudicata, estoppel, or law of case); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 to .3 (listing publication guidelines
and normally allowing citation of unpublished opinions only in cases with related facts, for res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of case); 6TH CI. R. 10(F) (allowing citation of
unpublished decisions only where no published opinion would serve as well, and for resjudicata,
collateral estoppel, and law of case), 24 (listing publication criteria); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv),
53(c) (1) (listing publication guidelines and allowing citation of unpublished orders only for res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of case); 8TH Ci. R. 28A(k) (allowing citation of
unpublished opinions only where cases are related by identity of parties or cause of action), 47B
(allowing affirmance or reversal without opinion when court determines that opinion would
have no precedential value); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2 (listing publication guidelines); 9TH Ci. R. 36-3
(stating that unpublished dispositions have no precedential value except for res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or law of the case); 10TH Cm. R. 36 (listing publication criteria and denying
precedential status to unpublished opinions); 11TH CiR. K 36-2 (denying binding precedential
value to unpublished opinions); FED. CM. R. 26 (listing publication criteria).
14. The Fifth Circuit's publication history provides a good example. In 1969, the Fifth
Circuit published opinions in more than 80% of its decisions. See NLRB v. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that Fifth Circuit
issued "printed" opinions in 1128 of 1372 appeals filed in 1969). In the 1978-79 statistical year,
the Fifth Circuit published opinions in only 58.6% of its decisions. See Reynolds & Richman,
supra note 9, at 587. In 1987, that percentage dropped to 46.7%. Keith H. Beyler, Selective
Publication Rules: An Empirical Study, 21 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 1, 7 n.19 (1989). Thus, the Fifth
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Although the Federal Judicial Center offered a model rule for
opinion publication,1 5 the courts of appeals have been free to adopt
whatever criteria they think appropriate. Not surprisingly, their rules
differ considerably, 6 not only in terms of criteria, but also in their
treatment of the precedential value of unpublished opinions. 17
Circuit's publication rate declined by approximately 41% from 1969 to 1987.
15. COMM. ON USE OF APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE
JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OFJUDICIAL OPINIONS 22-23 (1973) (reproducing Model
Rule on publication ofjudicial opinions).
16. All of the rules establish (at least implicitly) a presumption regarding the publication
of opinions. The rules of the District of Columbia, First, and Fifth Circuits favor publication,
while the others establish a presumption against publication. Compare D.C. CIiR. R. 14(A); IST
CIR. R. 36.1; 5TH CR. R. 47.5.1 with 2D Ci. R. 0.23; 3D Cn. I.O.P. 5.5.1; 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.4;
6TH C. R. 26; 7TH CIR. R. 53(A); 8TH CI. APP. I; 9m Cm. . 36-2; 10TH CI. R. 36.1; ll1H CIR.
I.O.P. OPINIONS FRAP 36; FED. CIR. R. 47.8. Furthermore, some circuits have detailed criteria
by which publication decisions will be made, while others provide only the most general
guidance. Compare D.C. CIR. R. 14(B); 4TH CiR. I.O.P. 36.4; 5TH CI. I 47.5.1; 6TH CIR. R. 26;
7TH CI. R. 53(c); 8TH CIR. R. 47B APP. 1; 9TH CR. R. 36-2; l1TH CIR. R. 36-1 (listing criteria)
with IsT C. I 36.2; 2D CR. R. 0.23; 3D Ci. I.O.P. 5.5.1; 10TH Cim. R. 36.1 TO .2; FED. CIR. R.
47.8 (providing general guidance).
17. Several circuits have declared that unpublished opinions are not precedential. SeeD.C.
CI. R. 11 (c) (stating that unpublished decisions are not precedential unless from jurisdiction
that gives precedential weight to its unpublished dispositions); 2D Ci. I. 0.23 (stating that
unpublished opinions cannot be cited in unrelated cases); 3D CIR. l.O.P. 5.6 (stating that
unpublished opinions have no precedential value). Four circuits allow citation of unpublished
opinions to establish resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. See4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.6;
7TH CR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv); 9TH C. R. 36-3; FED. Ci. I. 47.6(b). The Fifth Circuit considers its
unpublished dispositions precedential only in related cases or when they establish the law of the
case, resjudicata, or collateral estoppel. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3.
The precedential value of the Sixth Circuit's unpublished dispositions is undefined. Their
citation is "disfavored" except to establish resjudicata, estoppel, or the law of the case, or when
"there is no published opinion that would serve as well." 6TH CIR. R. 10(f). The Tenth Circuit
recently adopted a similar provision, suspending its Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995 or
further order. See General Order of Nov. 29, 1993 (10th Cir.), cited in Griggs v. State, No. 93-
3098, 1993 WL 520976 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 1993) (carrying notice explaining that citation is
disfavored but permitted if opinion is persuasive on material issue and copy is attached, but only
where no published opinion would serve as well).
This is the second time the Tenth Circuit has changed its citation rule. Until 1986, the Tenth
Circuit allowed citation of unpublished opinions. See William L. Reynolds & William L.
Richman, TheNon-PrecedentiaIPrecedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1181 (1978) (reprinting former 10Th CIR. Cr. AP.
It 17(c)). The Tenth Circuit changed its rule in 1986, over the dissent of then-ChiefJudge
Holloway and two other judges. See In re Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 36 (10th Cir. 1992) (giving historical background supporting court's
decision to adopt rule that denies precedential weight to unpublished opinions except under
doctrines of law of the case, collateral estoppel, and resjudicata).
Under the Eleventh Circuit's rule, unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, but may
be cited as persuasive authority. 11TH Ci. It 36-2. The Eleventh Circuit's handling of the
precedential status of unpublished opinions, however, is quite confusing. The court has stated
that unpublished opinions "are binding precedent." Harris v. United States, 769 F.2d 718, 721
n.1 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1294
(11th Cir. 1985); Philip NicholsJr., Selective Publication of Opinions: OneJudge's Vriew, 35 AM. U.
L REv. 909, 918 (1986). This view apparently follows the rule of the Fifth Circuit. See Howell
v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 524, 526-27 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that Eleventh Circuit was bound by
unpublished Fifth Circuit opinions rendered before Oct. 1, 1981 because "decision[s] without
published opinion[s] [are] binding precedent" (citing United States v. Ellis, 527 F.2d 863, 868
(5th Cir. 1977))). In another case, however, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "unpublished
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B. Summary Disposition
Summary disposition occurs when the court announces its judgment
of affirmance or reversal either orally in open court or in a terse
(often one-word) written disposition. Summary dispositions give no
written explanation of the court's reasoning-not even to the parties
or to researchers with access to unpublished opinions."8 The courts
of appeals issued more than 6200 summary dispositions in 1993;
nearly 300 were reversals in whole or in part.19 Summary disposition
rules and practices, much like rules regarding unpublished opinions,
vary among the circuits. ° The precedential value of summary
opinions are not considered binding precedent." United States v. Giltner, 972 F.2d 1563, 1564
n.2 (11th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) (citing 11TH CiR. R. 36-2).
18. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1174 n.38 (restating D.C. CIR. R. 14(d), which
allows court to dispense with unneeded opinions).
19. I ran a Westiaw search to locate 1993 appeals court cases disposed of without opinions.
The search yielded 6248 documents, although, in all likelihood, additional dispositions of this
type exist but do not appear online. Of the 6248 documents retrieved, 285 contained the term
"reversed." Each document included information about the style of the case, citation to its
publication in a table in the printed reports, a one line disposition statement ("affirmed,"
"reversed and remanded," etc.), and a court statement regarding the publication and
precedential status of the disposition. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 12 F.3d 217 (Table)
(11th Cir. 1993) (summarily affirming district courtjudgment).
20. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 14(c) (stating that court may dispense with published opinions as
it deems appropriate); 1ST CIR. R. 27.1 (stating that court can dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction,
affirm if no substantial question is presented, or reverse for obvious error); 2D CI. R. 0.23
(allowing summary disposition where decision is unanimous and panel finds that written opinion
serves no jurisprudential purpose); 3D Cm. I.O.P. 10.6 (requiring unanimous decision to employ
summary action); 4TH Cm. R. 34(a) (requiring unanimous decision for summary disposition),
I.O.P. 27.6 (allowing summary dispositions only in extraordinary cases); 5TH CI. R. 47.6 (listing
mandatory criteria for enforcement of lower court decision without opinion); 6TH CIR. R. 19
(permitting summary disposition when decision is unanimous and panel agrees that written
opinion serves no jurisprudential purpose); 7TH CmR. R. 53(b) (2) (iii), 53(d) (1) (stating that
majority ofjudges is necessary to publish disposition); 8TH Cm. R. 47A (stating that court may
summarily affirm or reverse when question presented requires no further consideration), 47B
(listing criteria for affirmance or enforcement without opinion); 9TH CI. R. 36-2 (listing criteria
for publication); 10TH CR. R 36.1 (stating that court may use its discretion to affirm or dismiss
appeal without written opinion); 11TH CIR. R. 36-1 (listing criteria for court affirmance without
opinion); FED. CM. R. 36 (same). All of the circuits allow summary affirmances, which are
issued either by order or orally in open court.
Although the Fifth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuit rules do not mention summary reversals,
they, like the other circuits, employ those as well. See, e.g., Buckhalter v. Burlington N. R.R., 1
F.3d 1237, 1237 (Table) (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith, 11 F.3d 167, 167 (Table) (11th
Cir. 1993); Speed Shore Corp. v. Allied Steel & Tractor Prods., 16 F.3d 421, 421 (Table), text
available on Westlaw, 1993 WL 514359 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
The Fourth Circuit's summary disposition procedure is explicitly linked to the decision to
dispense with oral argument. See 4TH CI. R. 34(a) (allowing any appropriate disposition
"including, but not limited to, affirmance or reversal" when all judges agree to dispense with
oral argument). In all circuits the court may decide to make a summary disposition. The
District of Columbia, First, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits allow the parties to move for such
disposition as well. D.C. C. R. 14(c); 1ST Cm. R. 27.1; 3D CIm. R. 27.4; 4TH CR. I.O.P. 27.6;
10TH CIR. R. 27.2.1. In the Fourth Circuit, such a motion may be made by the parties in
"extraordinary cases" only; "motions for summary affirmance or reversal are seldom granted."
4TH CiR. 1O.P. 27.6.
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dispositions is sometimes difficult to determine.'
C. Vacatur upon Settlement
Vacatur upon settlement is a "peculiar practice" in which courts
destroy decisions in accordance with settlement agreements by the
22parties. Vacatur upon settlement can occur at several stages. The
court of appeals may vacate the district court's judgment upon ajoint
motion by litigants who settle their dispute while appeal is pending.2
Occasionally, the court of appeals vacates its own judgment during the
pendency of a motion for rehearing or an appeal to the Supreme
Court or following the issuance of a remand.2 ' The Supreme Court
may be asked to vacate the court of appeals judgment when litigants
settle a case in which certiorari or appeal is pending before the
Court.25 Vacatur may or may not be a condition of the settlement
agreement.26
The use of vacatur upon settlement varies considerably among the
circuits.27 Proponents argue that a policy allowing routine vacatur
21. The Federal Circuit has stressed that a summary disposition should not be viewed as a
blanket adoption of the district court's reasoning because it may be based upon "any ground
appropriate to the case." Quad Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874
(Fed. Cir. 1991). In the District of Columbia, Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits, summary dispositions are not precedential. D.C. CIR. L 11 (c); 2D CIR. 1- 0.23; 3D CIR.
I.O.P. 5.6; 7TH CiR. R. 53(b) (2) (iii); 8TH CIR. R. 47B, App. I; 9TH CiR. R. 36-3. Tenth Circuit
Rule 36.3, denying precedential status to summary dispositions, has been suspended. See supra
note 17. The Federal Circuit allows citation to every disposition of the court except those
unanimously designated as nonprecedential. FED. Ci. R. 47.8. Rules permitting summary
dispositions in the remaining circuits are silent about the precedential value (other than
preclusive effect) of such dispositions. lST CIR. R. 27.1; 4TH CIR. R. 34(a); 5TH CIR. R. 47.6; 6TH
Ci. R. 19.
22. Jill E. Fisch, Captive Courts: The Destruction ofJudicial Decisions by Agreement of the Parties,
2 N.Y.U. ENVL. L.J. 191, 192 (1993).
23. Michael W. Loudenslager, Note, Erasing theLaw: The Implications ofSettlanents Conditioned
Upon Vacatur or Reversal ofJudgments, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229, 1233-35 (1993) (discussing
how various circuits respond to motions for vacatur).
24. Id.
25. The Court recently rejected the practice of routine vacatur upon settlement of the
litigation. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 389-90
(1994) (stating that Article III gives appellate courts right to dispose of entire case as justice
requires, but prohibits courts from considering merits of case when issue is moot); infra notes
243-52 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Banner Mall 115 S. Ct. at 386 (addressing unilateral motion of Bancorp for
vacatur of Ninth Circuit's decision after parties settled); Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Eabushiki Kaisha
v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (noting that after reaching settlement, partiesjointly
moved for vacatur); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993)
(explaining agreement whereby parties conditionally reached agreement to settle if Second
Circuit would vacate its decision).
27. The Second Circuit routinely grants joint motions for vacatur of the judgment below,
see, e.g., Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 756 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1985) (allowing vacatur because
parties' interest in settling their dispute outweighs public interest in judgment), and the Federal
Circuit has followed this practice, see, e.g., Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, 819
F.2d 277, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating vacatur is appropriate response for appellate court when
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of judgments will encourage settlement." But vacatur has the effect
of "eradicating,"" "erasing,"3° or nullifying decisional law without
any explanation or statement of reasons. 3' Vacatur is "an intrinsical-
ly ambiguous act." When courts of appeals vacate a judgment
upon settlement, they do not explain orjustify the action on the basis
of law, but by reference to consent of the parties. s Vacatur leaves
a gap in the law because there is no indication whether the vacated
judgment was correct.3t Vacatur gives litigants "the authority to
revise judicial opinions."3 Thus, vacatur upon settlement, along
with selective publication and summary disposition, tends to obscure
the law.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Judicial opinions serve many purposes for both thejudges who write
parties settle differences). But see Manufaturers Hanover, 11 F.3d at 381 (refusing to vacate court
of appeals' own judgment upon settlement). See generally Loudenslager, supra note 23, at 1233
(contrasting Second and Seventh Circuits' use of vacatur).
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has stated that it will always deny such motions. In
reMemorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that parties cannot erase court
opinions with private agreements). The District of Columbia and Third Circuits have adopted
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., 936 F.2d 127, 129 (3d Cir.
1991); Loudenslager, supra note 23, at 1233 n.34 (citing In re United States, 927 F.2d 626, 628
(D.C. Cir. 1691)).
The Ninth Circuit takes the intermediate position that the court should grant vacatur upon
settlement when the circumstances of the case warrant. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1989) (balancing parties' interests in avoiding
continuing litigation costs, and preserving their rights to relitigate same issues against other
parties, against public interest in finality ofjudgments, and potential interest of third parties who
may face litigation on same issues (citing Ringsby Truck Lines v. Western Conference of
Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1982))); see also Resnik, supra note 10, at 1484-85 n.55
(referring to practice as "vacatur on consent").
28. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaishav. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425,431 (1993)
(Stevens,J., dissenting from dismissal). Justice Stevens opposes routine vacatur. See infra notes
232-33 and accompanying text (discussing Stevens' views). For a summary of divergentjudicial
views on vacatur, see Resnik, supra note 10, at 1522-26.
29. Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through
Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 589 (1991) (discussing courts' willingness to
vacate judgments following settlement).
30. See Loudenslager, supra note 23, at 1229, 1233 (stating that circuit courts granting
vacatur are, in effect, vacating district court opinions on request of parties); see also Fisch, supra
note 22, at 192-93 (stating that courts are destroying decisions in accordance with settlement
agreements).
31. Of course, traditional legal research practices, such as shepardizing the case, will inform
the researcher that the judgment has been vacated.
32. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1512.
33. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1533.
34. Fisch, supra note 22, at 193 (asserting that vacatur does not explain outcome). For a
discussion of the subsequent use of vacated opinions, see Resnik, supra note 10, at 1509
(discussing use of vacated opinions as precedent and persuasive authority).
35. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1473.
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them and their eventual readers." To appreciate fully the value of
appellate opinions, one must bear in mind the role of the federal
courts of appeals and the manner in which law develops through
adjudication. Full, published opinions are essential to the operation
of the doctrine of stare decisis. They help ensure the legitimacy of
the judicial system and serve as the basic tools of lawyers and judges
in their daily work. This section reviews, as a preliminary matter, the
law-making responsibilities of federal courts of appeals. It then
examines the relationship of published opinions to the development
of law, the application of stare decisis, the legitimacy of the courts,
and the process of legal research and analysis.
The federal courts of appeals have a special obligation to articulate
a coherent body of decisional law 7 because they are the de facto
courts of last resort in the federal system."8 Significant controversy
surrounds the proper scope of federal decisional law9 and the role
of precedent in constitutional adjudication.40 For purposes of this
36. See BAKER, supra note 7, at 119-20 (articulating three primary purposes of written
opinion: assuring litigants and public that decision was based on reasoned judgment;
reinforcing decisionmaking and ensuring correctness; and creating precedent).
37. One of the most important tasks of a court is "keeping the underlying body of unwritten
law alive and growing, and not only rationally consistent within itself but rationally related to the
purposes which the social order exists to serve." Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment on Courts and
LaWMaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMOlutOW 40, 42-43 (1959). According to the
Federal Courts Study Committee, "modem society requires no less" than the "carefully crafted
case law" that results, at least in part, from the notion that judges "decide cases with sufficient
thought and produce opinions in cases of precedential importance with the care they deserve."
FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 109. I argue that virtually all cases are, at least
potentially, of "precedential importance."
38. Betten, supra note 7, at 67 (stating that circuit courts are last resort for 98.6% of district
court decisions).
39. This debate centers on the existence of federal common law. The Supreme Court held
in Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), that there is no federal common law, overruling
the contrary holding of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Professor Gilmore argues,
however, that "[e]ven at the time the Erie case was decided," a "federalizing principle" emerged
such that
the presence of any kind of federal interest in a case is enough to support the
conclusion that decision should be governed by federal law rather than by the law of
any state.... It was once assumed as a matter of course that gaps in an incomplete
federal statute were to be filled in in the light of principles borrowed from the
common law-that is, the law of some state. That approach has been superseded by
the idea that federal statutes generate a common law penumbra of their own: gaps are
to be filled in by a process of extrapolation from whatever the court conceives the basic
policy of the statute to be.
GILMORE, supra note 4, at 93-94.
40. See generally Monaghan, supra note 3, at 739-48 (discussing role and validity of stare
decisis in American legal system). The "conventional wisdom is that stare decisis should and
does have only limited application" in such cases. Id. at 741. Discussing the relative roles of text
and gloss in constitutional interpretation, however, Monaghan argues that:
[I]n [the] actual process of constitutional adjudication the constitutional text plays
only a role, and an increasingly subordinate one at that. ... [F]requently the text
operates as little more than a boundary marker restraining judicial law-making. In
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Article, it is sufficient to include federal decisions construing and
interpreting federal statutes and regulations and resolving issues in
"federal specialty areas."41 What is significant is the extent to which
courts of appeals rely on prior cases to guide their decisions-a
manner of adjudication very much like that of a common law
court.
42
In our three-tiered federal court system, the traditional role of the
courts of appeals was to review decisions for correctness. 43 Law-
making was reserved for the Supreme Court." Federal appeals
courts lack discretion to reject appeals,' even in cases where the law
is already well-settled. Hence, they undoubtedly hear some cases that
present little opportunity to make law or to extend or alter existing
law. But more often, federal appeals courts are called upon to
"announce, clarify, and harmonize the rules of decision employed by
the legal system in which they serve."' This role is extremely
important because the Supreme Court today reviews a minute
percentage of the decisions of the courts of appeals. 47 In 1993, for
example, the Supreme Court reviewed a mere 0.25% of federal
appeals court dispositions, and only 2.36% of cases in which petitions
each instance, the case law overwhelms the text and historical understanding. The
latter play no directive role in determining most issues. Thus, in the arena of
constitutional adjudication it is quite possible to see the case law and not the text as
of central importance.
Id. at 771-72. Monaghan concludes that "[a] t this point in our history, when adherence to stare
decisis promotes the underlying values of stability and continuity better than does adherence
to the original understanding, the latter cannot prevail." Id. at 772. In any event, the debate
about the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication focuses primarily on thejurisprudence
of the Supreme Court in view of its role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional disputes. The
resolution of that controversy is not critical to this Article's analysis.
41. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 94. Gilmore notes:
Since World War II the Supreme Court has given a wide currency to the ideas that, in
federal specialty areas [such as admiralty, bankruptcy, and patents], a federal rule must
be "fashioned" if one does not already exist and that a proper regard for federal
supremacy requires the application of the federal rule even if the forum of litigation
is a state court.
Id. at 94-95.
42. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISiS AND REFORM 202 (1985)
(recognizing that federal courts often must apply judge-made law in deciding issues before
them).
43. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976).
44. Id. at 2-4.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) provides for appeal from "all final decisions" of the district
courts. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS § 2.02 (2d ed. 1993) (describing finality
doctrine and noting exceptions).
46. CARRINrTON ET AL, supra note 43, at 3.
47. In the statistical year ending September 30, 1993, appeals courts disposed of 47,790
appeals. In the same year, parties filed 5110 petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court
granted only 138, 17 of which were dismissed. Petitions for Review on Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the Twelve Month Period Ending September
30, 1993, in 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, tbl. B-2.
.1995]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSETY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:757
for certiorari were filed.48
As a result, the courts of appeals have become the effective courts
of last resort in the federal system. In more than 99% of the cases
the courts of appeals hear, they bear ultimate law-making responsibili-
ty.49 The percentage of district court dispositions appealed has
increased dramatically, indicating a growing demand for both error
correction and law-making from appeals courts.50 This responsibility
requires the courts of appeals to evaluate their procedures not only
in light of caseload pressures but also in light of the impact of their
procedures on the development of the law and the integrity of the
judicial process.
A. The Development of Law Through Adjudication
In a common law system, the law develops, as every law student
learns, through case-by-case adjudication.5' It develops not in a
linear fashion, but by accretion, like the reef formed by the gradual
deposit of shells. Case law develops in fits and starts, as specific
disputes present themselves for resolution. The resolution of each
new case results in the announcement of a legal rule-represented by
a shell-that is laid down next to or atop the rules-or
shells-deposited in earlier, related cases. Gradually a discemable
structure develops. That structure is irregularly shaped. It consists of
lumps, holes, and tentacles that stretch outward in various direc-
tions.5"
48. This low review rate has persisted for many years. The following statistics are illustrative:
1970 1980 1990 1993
Appeals Terminated 10,669 20,877 38,520 47,790
Certiorari Filed 1,977 2,433 3,406 5,110
Certiorari Granted 107 139 146 138
Certiorari Dismissed 42 11 11 17
Actually Reviewed 65(.60%) 128(.61%) 135(.35%) 121(.25%)
1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, tls. B-i, B-2. According to the Federal Courts Study
Committee, in 1945, the Supreme Court reviewed 7.9% of appeals court terminations, and 21%
of cases in which petitions for certiorari were filed. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 7,
at 111.
49. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 110 (stating that increase in appellate
cases and decrease in Supreme Court review have transformed courts of appeals into enunciators
of national law).
50. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 7, at 110. Litigants in 1945 appealed about
1 in 40 district court dispositions; in 1988 they appealed 1 in 8. Id.
51. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1989) (analyzing
role of precedent in common law legal system); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHL L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) (describing common law system as system in which law
grows through fact-specific pronouncements).
52. See Scalia, supra note 51, at 1177 ("The law grows and develops ... case-by-case,
deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time.").
53. For another model explaining how leading cases in a particular area of the law form
a coherent whole, even though they contain no common legal feature, see Bruce Chapman, The
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The judge charged with deciding a case (or the attorney preparing
to argue it) can only examine this structure, such as it is, and attempt
to determine where the case fits. 54 Few cases are exactly alike, and
new ones often fall into gaps in the structure. Existing rules must be
expanded or modified, or new rules created to fill the gaps.5 In
deciding a case, judges search precedent (along with public policies,
notions of fairness, and a variety of other inputs) 56 for the firmest
possible foundation upon which to attach expanded, modified, or new
rules. And so the structure grows. Both judge and lawyer, of course,
must also take note of currents that alter the structure of the law in
a process similar to erosion.
The increasing importance of statutes and regulations does not
dramatically alter this conception of the law's evolutionary prog-
ress.5" Statutes and regulations provide an underlying structure that
Rational and theReasonable: Social Choice Theoy andAdjudicatin, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 65-67,76-
77, 104 (1994) (analyzing development of tort law notions of privity, forseeability, and liability
to illustrate how bodies of law develop over time).
54. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 130-31 (recognizing that statutes, precedent, and other legal
values constrain judicial decisionmaking).
55. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 131 (stating that when traditional constraints on judicial
decisionmaking leave judges with few options, many will turn to policy).
56. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 131 (explaining traditional process of adjudication).
57. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 128 (identifying growth of statutes as one cause of decline
in legal consensus).
58. See RogerJ. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401,
401-02 (1968). Judge Traynor remarks:
A judge's responsibility is the greater now that legislatures fabricate laws in such
volume. The endless cases that proceed before him increasingly involve the meaning
or applicability of a statute, or on occasion its constitutionality.... The hydraheaded
problem is how to synchronize the unguided missiles launched by legislatures with a
going system of common law.
Id.
The judge's responsibility is "not simply ajob of confining the reach of a statute when that
is appropriate[, but also entails] the perceptive use of policies embodied in statutes as bases for
development of the general law." Hart, supra note 37, at 43.
On this topic, see generally Gumo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982), particularly chapter XII, entitled The Role of Courts in an Age ofStatute. Calabresi argues:
Whatever common law role can remain for the courts in our age of statutes must, like
the traditional common law role, leave to the legislatures the last say, unless
constitutional guarantees are involved .... [The courts' common-law function today]
is the judgmental function (which cannot successfully be accomplished by sunset laws
or automatic updatings) of deciding when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of
phase with the whole legal framework so that, whatever its age, it can only stand if a
current majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it. It is to be the allocator of that
burden of inertia which our system of separation of powers and checks and balances
mandates. It is to assign the task of overcoming inertia to that interest, whose desires
do not conform with the fabric of the law, and hence whose wishes can only be
recognized if current and clear majoritarian support exists for them. It is this task (so
like that exercised by courts in updating the common law) which desperately needs
doing in a checked and balanced statutory world like ours, and it can be done by
courts using traditional judicial methods and modes of reasoning.
Id. at 164.
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may be more regular than the one described above.59 Legislative
bodies and agencies are not restricted to addressing only specific cases
or controversies that are ripe for adjudication, but may attempt to
regulate prospectively an entire set of problems or circumstances.60
Nevertheless, statutes and regulations provide only a skeleton,6 and
the task of judges or attorneys in cases governed by statute or
regulation is largely the same as in cases arising under the common
law. Thus, only careful examination of judicial opinions reveals the
structure of the law, whether common law or the "common law
penumbra"62 that surrounds statutes and regulations.
B. The Relationship of Opinion Publication to Stare Decisis
Published opinions that state the facts and the reasoning upon
which decisions rest are essential to the operation of stare decisis, a
fundamental doctrine of our legal system.63 Stare decisis requires
that a prior decision be followed in subsequent cases unless it is distin-
guished or overruled. The application of the doctrine usually turns
on a determination of the identity between the two cases-a determi-
nation that cannot be made unless the facts and reasoning of the
prior case are known.' 4 Indeed:
59. See Hart, supra note 37, at 42-43 (remarking that unwritten common law is less firm than
legislative law).
60. See Lillian R. BeVier, Judicial Restraint: An Argument from Institutional Design, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 7, 9-11 (1994) (comparing judiciary's task of resolving specific dispute to
legislature's task of broad policymaking).
61. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, How TO UNmERsrAN THE LAw 54-61 (1989) (discussing
interaction between legislatures, which make laws, and courts, which must often interpret and
give flesh to those laws in deciding specific cases). Similarly, Judge Posner states that courts
must make law when legislative bodies have not acted; when legislatures, possessing only general
knowledge, create problems by passing laws that cannot possibly cover all cases that may arise;
and when the political process of passing legislation forces compromises that result in
incoherent law. POsNER, supra note 42, at 4-5. The Sherman Act, the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are but a few examples of laws that have
necessitated judicial lawmaking. The broad language of these statutes has required many years
and thousands of cases to give them meaningful definition, and the definitions continue to
evolve.
62. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 285 (referring to judicial interpretations of statutes).
63. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (opinion of
Rehnquist, CJ.) (describing stare decisis as "a cornerstone of our legal system"); Alexander,
supra note 51, at 3 (calling stare decisis core feature of adjudication in United States' legal
system); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Preceden 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 367 (1988) (insisting that central
tenet of United States' legal system is that judges are constrained by precedent). Elsewhere,
Chief'Justice Rehnquist has stated that stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance onjudicial decisions, and contributes
to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597, 2609 (1991).
64. See Maltz, supra note 63, at 372 (explaining that precedent controls future cases with
similar facts).
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[i]n a legal system built on stare decisis, the law-announcing
function of opinions as precedents . . .. is the function most
emphasized among law students, law teachers and members of the
bar, particularly as they study opinions in an attempt to ascertain
"what the law is".... (J]udicial opinions originate the legal rules,
principles, standards, and policies that comprise the main body of
society's law ... '
The close relationship between the doctrine of stare decisis and
opinion publication practices is best illustrated by reviewing the
parallel histories of their development.
The concept that a written record of decisions is needed for a
system of law based on precedents to function is not new.6" But for
centuries, the most important sources of the law were treatises that
restated the law,67  such as the commentaries of Coke' and
Blackstone.69 Decisions were relatively few, and many of the fields
of law we know today did not exist. The law could be reduced to a
treatise that synthesized, but did not reproduce, the precedents. 0
Moreover, law was practiced in a more homogeneous society and was
primarily confined to the localjurisdiction. Lawyers and judges could
remember the salient precedents as easily as law students today
65. Leflar, supra note 6, at 810-11.
66. See HAIG BOSMAIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 23 (1992) (stating
that written records are necessary for legal systems based upon precedent). The Anglo-American
practice dates back at least to the early British Yearbooks of'the 14th century. These reports,
however, like private reports that followed them, were unofficial and incomplete, and their
accuracy is questionable. Id. at 23-24.
67. See CRAIG E. KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 12-14 nn.31-32 (1993). Early treatises served as the basic text for legal education.
Henry St. George Tucker wrote of Blackstone' Commentarie.
The transcendental merit of the Commentaries on the Laws of England precludes
every idea of improvement, on the method observed in them; and where the law
remains unaltered, it would be presumption to deviate from the authority, or even the
language of their Author, the precision of the one being equal to the weight of the
other.
St. George Tucker's Lecture Notebooks, Tucker-Coleman Collection, Earl Gregg Swem Library,
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, cited in id. at 14 n.66. Although some of
the described laws were inapplicable in the United States, early American lawyers used the
Commentaries as a prototype for American law. Id. at 31. St. George Tucker later revamped
Blackstone's Commentaries to make it wholly relevant to the United States. HENRY ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA (Winchester, Va. 1831); see also DANIEL J.
BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3 (1941) (stating that in first century of
American jurisprudence, "the Commentarieswere not merely an approach to the study of law; for
most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law").
68. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(Philadelphia, R.H. Small 1853).
69. SIR WILLIAM BLACKsTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WrrH NOTES OF REFERENCE
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Philadelphia, Birch & Small 1803).
70. See, e.g., id. passim.
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remember black letter rules.7' Legal "research," therefore, was a
very different process. Lawyers usually consulted only a small number
of highly familiar sources, including their own notes of important
cases.
72
In America, the first fully developed publication ofjudicial decisions
came in 1789,7' nearly two centuries after the establishment of the
first colony. The first American reports consisted of lawyers' notes
published as a public service.74 They bore small resemblance to
modern reports.75 Once publication of opinions caught on, howev-
er, the stock of American legal materials grew rapidly. As early as the
1820s the legal profession complained about the rapidly multiplying
law reports and treatises.7' The multiplication of published decisions
mirrored the rapid increase in litigation and the growing complexity
of the law.77  By the 1880s, nearly 1000 decisions were issued
annually,78 far too many to summarize neatly in treatises or carry in
one's memory.
79
71. Chapman comments on the relationship of legal sources to the process of learning the
law, and in so doing, illustrates the extent to which published opinions have eclipsed treatises
as authority:
[T]he mastery of law is more than the mastery of a set of rules ordering the cases. On
the latter view, it would be better to read legal textbooks, which provide tidy
rationalizations of the cases, than to read the cases themselves, and better to substitute
quiet and isolated reflection for the daily confusions of on-site muddling through.
That we have chosen to learn law the other way is testimony to the truth of Holmes's
well-known claim that the life of the law is not logic, but experience.
Chapman, supra note 53, at 77 (citations omitted).
72. SeeJOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 75-76 (1968) (indicating that lawyers
most often relied on their own case notes, which were passed around legal circles, copied, and
sometimes published).
73. BOSMAJIAN, supra note 66, at 25; see also FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS
OF LEGAL RESEARCH 130-31 (3d ed. 1942) (listing years covered by each state's and federal
court's official reporter system). Although the Centuy Digest purports to cover the years 1658
onward, its pages contain very few cases prior to 1820. Cases included in the digest were drawn
not only from reporters but also "a great mass of legal periodicals and miscellaneous legal
publications." 1 CENTURY DIGEST iii (1897). Thus, the fact that its coverage dates back to 1658
does not negate the statement that legal reporting developed only after the Revolution.
74. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Dedsis: The Critical Years, 1800-1850, 3
Am. J. LEG. HIST. 28, 34 (1959) (recognizing that no official reports existed in American
colonies, but some jurisdictions published lawyers' notes).
75. Id. According to Kempin, early reporters of decisions "were interested almost entirely
in the arguments of counsel," not the opinion of the court. Id. at 35. Formal opinions did not
emerge in the courts until the early 19th century. Id.
76. See Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative
of Digital Information, 69 WASH. L. REV. 9, 26-27 (1994) (discussing how increase in judicial
opinions overwhelmed primitive organizational system).
77. See id. at 20-21 (remarking that publication of all available cases and expansion of legal
system dramatically increased raw data available to legal researchers).
78. Id. at 28.
79. See id. at 19-21 (observing that large volume of cases began to overwhelm lawyers'
capacity to remember); see also KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 7 (1989)
(describing how increases in cases led to "inferior work force" sorting through volumes of
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Not coincidentally, the "now-orthodox theory of truly binding
precedent,"0 which places a premium on the ability to locate
relevant precedent, came into its own only in the nineteenth
century.8 1 While the general doctrine of precedent was well
established at a much earlier date, 2 the strict doctrine of stare
decisis is relatively young." The general theory of precedent
encouraged citing precedents en masse to illustrate for the court the
nature of the law on the question involved. 4 The doctrine of stare
decisis, on the other hand, is a "peculiar and legal adaptation of the
common practice of relying on past experience," which "reaches its
apogee when a single precedent is considered to be a 'binding'
authority."5 The development of the strict doctrine of stare decisis
is tied directly to the availability of reliable case reports,8 6 upon
which the doctrine is utterly dependent.
By the mid-nineteenth century, as the doctrine of stare decisis
matured, the unsystematic, idiosyncratic private reporting of vastly
increased numbers of cases became ill-suited to the conduct of
individual cases).
80. LLEvELLYN, supra note 79, at 6.
81. LLEWELLYN, supra note 79, at 6.
82. See Kempin, supra note 74, at 30 (stating that stare decisis, which developed around
1800, grew out of earlier system of precedent); see also SIR CARLETON ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING
187-235 (1964) (finding roots of precedent in 13th century); DAWSON, supra note 72, at 78-90
(finding traces of precedent in 18th century); E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE
L. REV. 1043,1047 (1975) (fixing beginning ofprecedentin middle ages). These commentators
variously fix the date at which a general doctrine of precedent took hold, but generally agree
that its origins are, in the context of our legal system, ancient. Allen, for example, finds the first
substantial evidence of the doctrine in the writings of Bracton in the late 13th century. "our
own debt to Bracton is owed... in a large measure for the foundation of a system of precedents
which, rightly or wrongly, has become an indispensable part of our system." ALLEN, supra, at
117.
83. See ALLEN, supra note 82, at 233 (indicating that modem doctrine of stare decisis was
still unsettled in late 1800s); Kempin, supra note 74, at 30-31 (distinguishing between precedent
and doctrine of stare decisis and commenting on reasons for latter's late development).
84. Kempin, supra note 74, at 30. To some extent, the evolution from a general theory of
precedent to a strict doctrine of stare decisis is also related to broader developments in legal
philosophy, such as the shift from natural law to positivist views that occurred around the same
time. Kempin describes the gradual evolution from the view that cases were the best evidence
of what the law is, to the view that cases are law. Id. at 31-32, 37-38.
85. Kempin, supra note 74, at 29.
86. SeeKempin, supranote 74, at31, 32 (citing W.S. Holdsworth, CaseLaw, 50 L.Q. REV. 180
(1934) (articulating as one reason for stare decisis' late development that early reporters were
few and often unreliable)); see also DAWSON, supra note 72, at 80. Dawson argues that a concept
of precedent as binding--stare decisis--"could not emerge ... until after 1800. The lack of
reliable law reports was both symptom and cause; unreliable law reports were tolerated because
theories of precedent were not strict, but theories of precedent could not be strict until reports
became reliable." Id. But see RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the
DualFunctions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447,475-76 (1994) (fixing establishment
of doctrine of stare decisis somewhat earlier).
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meaningful legal research. 7 These parallel developments led to the
inception of modem, systematic, nationwide court reporting.88
Modem case law research was made possible by the rigid categoriza-
tion of decisions according to the issues they presented.89  Reports
and indexes were organized by jurisdiction (at least regionally), but
the use of identical categories across jurisdictions facilitated broad-
scale research.9" No matter how numerous the precedents, relevant
authority could be located.9 This system, developed in the 1870s,
not only allowed the doctrine of stare decisis to flourish, but also
increased dependence on published opinions.92
Today, approximately 60,000 federal and state court decisions are
published each year.93 Commentators suggest that the increasing
volume of cases has overwhelmed the reporting system, and in fact,
it is this belief that led to the adoption of selective publication
practices and noncitation rules.94 Existing methods of case law
research have collapsed under the weight of decisions, at least for
research that is national in scope.95 Moreover, application of the
doctrine of stare decisis becomes more complex as the body of
potentially relevant precedents grows.
Technological developments of the past two decades have partially
remedied the situation.9" Online databases provide access to a larger
87. See Berring, supra note 76, at 21-22 (detailing rise of West Publishing classification
system in response to increasing numbers of published cases and impossibility of traditional
research methods).
88. See Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75
CAL. L REV. 15, 20-22 (1987) (stating that need for better legal tools pushed publishers toward
standard, comprehensive court reports).
89. See id. at 24-25 (explaining West Digest system's structure). In fact, consistency, the
requirement that like cases be decided alike, is "the primary organizing principle for the cases
themselves." Chapman, supra note 53, at 67.
90. See Berring, supra note 88, at 21 (praising West's development of uniform reporting
system).
91. See Berring, supra note 88, at 28 (relating how West's classification system facilitated
location of relevant authority).
92. See Kempin, supra note 74, at 34-36 (documenting growth of published opinions as
necessary precondition to birth of stare decisis).
93. Berring, supra note 76, at 27. An estimated 40,000 additional cases are available in
electronic format. Id.
94. See Hinderks & Leben, supra note 10, at 157-58, 161-65 (recognizing national trend to
selectively publish court opinions and prohibit citation of unpublished opinions).
95. See generally Berring, supra note 76, at 28 (documenting inability of West Digest System
to handle onslaught of legal opinions); Hinderks & Leben, supra note 10, at 156-58 (stating that
unpublished decisions and noncitation rules evolved to cure problems relating to growing
number ofjudicial opinions). While the Centuy Digest covered state and federal decisions from
1658-1896 in 50 volumes, the most recent editions of the decennial digests cover only five years
each in about 50 volumes. MORRIS L. COHEN ET AL, FINDING THE LAw 99 (1989).
96. See Hinderks & Leben, supra note 10, at 176-82 (indicating that accessibility of
computers and databases has made legal information more available).
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collection of decisions than would otherwise be available, 97 alleviat-
ing concerns about the amount of space required to house print
reporters. Online technology also permits researchers greater
flexibility in searching than the rigid digest categories allowed."
Researchers can often complete large research projects more quickly
online than they could using printed sources. Online research
technology continually advances in ways that make research even
easier, as evidenced by innovations such as natural language search-
ing, online citation verification capabilities, and hypertext links
between a retrieved document and the authorities it cites. Arguments
about the need to constrain the number of precedents have lost force
as a result.
C. Opinions as Prerequisites to the Legitimacy of the Judicial Procesr
Judicial opinions are one means by which a legal system secures its
"own acceptance in the society it governs."' A legal system is a
framework of enforceable rules intended to regulate the conduct of
society's members and, thus, to secure the benefits of liberty and
social cooperation.' It is a hallmark of a legal system's legitimacy
that its rules ought to be unambiguous, free of gaps and conflicts, and
knowable in advance. 02 Clearly articulated and publicly announced
rules allow citizens to act lawfully, enable parties to determine when
litigation is appropriate, permit trial courts to reach correct results in
most cases, and ensure that appellate courts can decide future cases
97. See Hinderks & Leben, supra note 10, at 178 (discussing access to judicial opinions
through Westaw and LEXIS).
98. See Berring, supra note 76, at 28-29 (noting that online systems allow information
retrieval via many methods).
99. This section sketches major jurisprudential principles underlying the American legal
system, and cites a few leading scholars in this vast and complex field of study. Philosophies of
the cited scholars differ in many respects, and it may seem strange to see them cited together.
My purpose, however, is to show that certain fundamental concepts underlie virtually all modem
jurisprudential theories. These basic principles are essential to the legitimacy of the legal
system, no matter what one's specific philosophy regarding that system.
100. Leflar, supra note 6, at 812.
101. See; e.g., D'AMATO, supra note 61, at 1 (defining function of law as "artificial mechanism
designed to channel human behavior into directions society wants");JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 235 (1971) (describing legal system as system of rules intended to promote cooperation
while regulating conduct); Gregory C. Keating, Fuelity to Pre-Existing Law and the Legitimacy of
Legal Decsion, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (asserting that law defines rights and duties
and governs expectations).
102. See Keating, supra note 101, at 8-9. It must be possible to classify every alternative course
of action as "required, optional or forbidden." Id. The law must be "complete and coherent,
that is, free of insoluble internal conflicts." Id. at 8. But seeJules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L REV. 549, 560 (1993) (suggesting that some
forms of indeterminacy are "both necessary and desirable").
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fairly and efficiently.103
Judicial decisions are exercises in "sheer power."'" Federal
judges must reach correct, timely, and uniform decisions, and
announce them in opinions that explain them in a reasoned
manner.0 5  According to Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, reasoned opinions "lend [decisions] legitimacy,
permit public evaluation, and impose a discipline on judges,"106 thus
promoting public confidence in the integrity of the courts.' 7 Judge
Holloway of the Tenth Circuit cautions that "the basic purpose for
stating reasons within an opinion or order must never be forgot-
ten-that the decision must be able to withstand the scrutiny of
analysis.., as to its soundness.., and as to its consistency with our
precedents." 10 8 The rule of law requires that "all grounds for a
decision be displayed in the judicial opinion, so that the justificatory
argument can be subject to public disagreement, dissent, and
correction.""0 9 Moreover, an opinion helps show litigants that their
case received the court's full and thoughtful consideration, and may
help them to identify bases for further appeals."0
103. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 599 (1987) (concluding that
coherent body of law is vital to courts' ability to cope with burgeoning caseloads). Justice
Cardozo, explaining that "adherence to precedent should be the rule and not the exception,"
wrote that "the labor ofjudges would be increased almost to the breaking point if... one could
not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who
had gone before him." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL.PROCESS 149
(1921).
Landes and Posner, in an economic analysis comparing litigation to settlement, assert that
"the ratio of lawsuits to settlements is mainly a function of the amount of uncertainty, which
leads to divergent estimates by the parties of the probable outcome of the litigation. The
amount of legal uncertainty is, in turn, a function of the stock of legal rules, a stock in most
areas of the law composed largely of precedents." William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal
Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 271 (1976) (footnote
omitted); see also POSNER, supra note 42, at 255 (remarking that uncertainty in case law invites
litigation).
104. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1536.
105. Patricia M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under
Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 768 (1983).
106. Id.
107. See BosMAjIAN, supra note 66, at 27-28 (stating that published opinions serve to satisfy
public and litigants that justice has been done).
108. In re Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir.
1992); see also BAKER, supra note 7, at 119-20 (stating that written opinions serve three central
purposes: first, they assure that judicial opinions are "the product of reasoned judgment and
thoughtful evaluation" and do not result from mere "whim and caprice"; second, they ensure
correctness and reinforce decisionmaking; and third, in regard to appellate decisions, "they
create precedents").
109. Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law,
103 YALE L.J. 997, 1022 (1994); see also Chapman, supra note 53, at 43 (stating that judicial
opinions should outline all reasons for decisions in order to maintain legitimacy).
110. See BOSMAJIAN, supra note 66, at 28 (stating that published opinions satisfy public's
desire forjustice, guide future judges, and provide bases for appeal); Songer et al., supra note
12, at 963 (stating that judicial opinions help litigants understand rules of law and outcome of
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Although case law develops in a manner that is not entirely
predictable, it effectively balances the need for general, public rules
with the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances. Courts
achieve this balance by designing their practices to take account of
several core values that lend legitimacy to the judicial process.
Stability, certainty, and predictability are prerequisites to the consent
of the public to be governed by law, including judge-made law."'
So, too, are the requirements that cases be decided consistently and
according to preexisting authority."2  The core values of stability,
certainty, predictability, consistency, and fidelity to authority overlap,
as do the labels used to describe them.' Thus, it is important to
examine each value in order to appreciate how appellate courts'
practices might endanger it.
1. Stability
Stability in the law refers to the balance between continuity with the
past and flexibility to address current problems."4 In other words,
stability expresses the tension between minimizing disruptive or
chaotic change and maintaining the ability of the legal system to keep
pace with developments in society."5 The doctrine of stare decisis
case).
111. Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, for example, consider it imperative that judges
announce reasons for their decisions. A statement of reasons assures a considered decision and
facilitates public understanding and acceptance of the decision. CARRNGTON ET AL, supra note
43, at 9-10. Llewellyn discusses at length the need for reckonability in the law. Llewellyn's work
responded to the perceived danger that the bar was losing confidence in the steadiness of the
courts and in the law, and that the courts might lose their feeling for and responsibility to
continuity. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 14-15 (1960).
112. Gregory Keating stated it another way:
Taking seriously the idea of decision in accordance with pre-existing norms thus
imposes three general conditions on the practice of legal decision. First, the practice
must meet the formal conditions of generality, publicity, prospectivity, and impartiali-
ty.... Second, the practice of legal justification must express the contrast between the
rule of general norms and the rule of persons (the rule of law and the rule of
"men").... Third, legaIjustification ... must be able to perform the institutional task
assigned to it-the task of ordering conflicting claims on the basis of legal reasons.
Keating, supra note 101, at 7-8.
113. There is also some disagreement about the "value" of these core values. See Schauer,
supra note 103, at 600-02. Schauer, for example, is skeptical of arguments that "focus on stability
for stability's sake." Id. at 601. He believes that values such as stability, predictability, and
efficiency in decisionmaking promote "suboptimal" decisions because decisionmakers may ignore
the "full richness of human experience." Id. at 600.
114. See GILMORE, supra note 4, at 14 (defining law as "[t]he process by which a society
accommodates to change without abandoning its fundamental structure"); see also Russell K.
Osgood, The Enterprise ofJudging, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 13, 15 (1994) (arguing that judges
need to understand and accept evolution in law).
115. See CALABRESI, supra note 58, at 3-5 (examining ramifications of fundamental change
in America from legal system based on common law to one dominated by statutes). One
implication of the change in America's legal system is the balance between continuity and
change. Id. at 3. Calabresi explains that courts and legislatures effect change and maintain
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advances stability in the law by presuming the rationality of existing
law," 6 while realizing that change may be necessary to maintain the
integrity of the law. 17  Stability in the law is a major component of
stability in government and in society.' It fosters orderly transi-
tions of power and steady economic development.1 Most impor-
tandy, stability in the law helps to ensure the continued vitality of the
legal system itself.1 2°
2. Certainty
Certainty in the law requires that once an issue is decided the
ruling is final and, under normal circumstances, will not be reexam-
ined.'2 ' This notion, of course, is central to the doctrine of stare
decisis' 22 While rules might not exist to cover every eventuality,
once a rule is established it may be relied upon with confidence.' 23
Inherent in certainty is the idea that it is sometimes more important
to have a well-established rule than to search endlessly for the best
rule.124 The proliferation of laws and increased utilization of the
judicial system make the difficulties associated with uncertainty in the
law more acute.12 Moreover, uncertainty in the law undermines
continuity in very different ways. Changes in the law occur incrementally when made by the
courts, and suddenly when made by legislatures. Id. at 4-5. Continuity in the law is preserved
by the courts' constant reexamination and reaffirmation of precedents. Statutes can remain in
force long after they become obsolete, in the sense that a majority no longer supports them,
because legislatures are generally not required to reassess existing legislation. Id.
116. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978) (Powell,J., concur-
ring).
117. See Kempin, supra note 74, at 49 (arguing that cases should be overruled when their
reasoning is discovered to be incorrect); see also ALLEN, supra note 82, at 334-66 (discussing how
British view, in which House of Lords would not overrule past decisions even when reason
dictated that it should, resulted in law's inability to keep pace with changes in society).
118. SeeJohn T. Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role ofJudicialPrecedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 3-4 (1953) (explaining that stare decisis ensures social stability).
119. See RAWLS, supra note 101, at 237-38 (stating that stable legal system fosters organization
of social behavior and provides basis for expectations).
120. See Loughran, supra note 118, at 1-3 (arguing that stability has enabled common law to
remain preeminent because it creates uniformity and equality in law).
121. See D'AMATO, supra note 61, at 86 (stating that judges may feel compelled to follow
precedent in order to promote feeling of certainty); RAWLS, supra note 101, at 237 (arguing that
in order for people to regulate their behavior, cases that are alike must be treated similarly).
122. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) (stating that stare decisis fosters
consistent and reliable development of law).
123. See id. (stating that stare decisis promotes predictability in law and fosters reliance on
decisions).
124. Id. ("'[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right.'" (quoting Buruet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); see also Chapman, supra note 53, at 111 (stating that it might
be just as important to find acceptable rule as it is to find best rule).
125. See Scalia, supra note 51, at 1179 (arguing that we can no longer afford uncertainty in
law because of individuals' increased dependence on courts).
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citizens' confidence in the legal system.126
3. Predictability
Predictability arises from our need to know what the law is on a
specific issue.127  This value incorporates the idea that the law
should be relatively free of gaps and conflicts.128 Unpredictability
"vitiat[es] a cardinal purpose in the law"-influencing future
conduct. 29 If the law is in a constant state of flux, it cannot induce
people to behave in ways deemed beneficial to society.8 0 It is
unfair to expect citizens to conform their conduct to the require-
ments of the law if they cannot determine what the law is and predict
the legal consequences of proposed actions. If the rules are
unpredictable, the risks inherent in a proposed course of conduct
cannot be calculated, and potentially beneficial transactions will be
deferred or avoided altogether.3 2  Similarly, criminal law cannot
deter undesirable conduct if criminals cannot predict the likelihood
126. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 102, at 559-94 (arguing that while absolute
determinacy in law is neither possible nor desirable, basic notion that citizens must be able to
know rules in order to follow and accept them is legitimate); Kutz, supra note 109, at 1000
(stating that unpredictability of legal consequences frustrates faith in legal and political systems).
127. Justice Holmes wrote:
[T]he reason why.., people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is
that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges
in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to
carry out theirjudgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances
and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be
feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence
of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in THE HOLMES READER 59 (Julius J. Marke ed.,
1955).
128. See Keating, supra note 101, at 16-19 (arguing that gaps and conflicts in law frustrate
predictability but are unavoidable).
129. Charles D. Breitel, The Lannakers, 65 COLum. L. REv. 749, 774 (1965).
130. See PosNER, supra note 42, at 248 (stating that regulatory purpose served by continuity
in law is frustrated by constant changes in law).
131. See RAWIS, supra note 101, at 238 (stating that what laws regulate must be clear so that
citizens know how to behave); Kutz, supra note 109, at 1000 (stating that citizens cannot predict
legal consequences when law is indeterminate); Schauer, supra note 103, at 597 (stating that
ability to predict outcome of cases allows people to anticipate future).
Numerous opinions of the courts of appeals discuss the importance of predictability of results.
See, e.g., Aguirre v. United States, 956 F.2d 1166 (Table), text available on Westlaw, 1992 WL 38624,
at *5 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that although judges are not constitutionally bound to follow
precedent, chaos would result if they continually made conflicting decisions), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 968 (1993); United States v. Diaz-Bastardo, 929 F.2d 798, 799 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that
in criminal cases, fairness requires adherence to principles of stare decisis).
132. SeeLakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907,911 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that unpredictability in law may disrupt
commercial relations due to need for certainty of result).
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and severity of punishment for their actions.'33
4. Consistency
The fundamental requirement that like cases be decided alike
produces consistency in the law.134 This value is essential to fair and
impartial decisionmaking. 35 Consistency is a prerequisite to the
operation of stare decisis, which applies when cases are indistinguish-
able.136 The legal system must provide for "uniform and coherent
enunciation and application of the law," because "a legal system which
tolerates needless disuniformity and incoherence.., has forsaken its
commitment to even-handed decision-making."'3 7  Consistency
among panels of an appellate court is particularly important because
the law-making responsibilities of these courts require them to
develop a coherent body of law."3 Recognizing this fact, the courts
of appeals have adopted prior-panel rules 3 9 and procedures such as
en banc review to ensure uniformity within the circuit.1 40
5. Fidelity to authority
Fidelity to authority is central to the notion of a rule of law, not of
persons. 141 It is, in a sense, the very core ofjudging:
[T]o judge . . .means to decide by reference to preexisting
133. See Stephen G. Ben6, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys? An Economic Approach to Lawyer
Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907,921-22 (1991) (discussing calculation of benefits and
costs of criminal activities under general theory of deterrence); Christopher A. Wray, Note,
Corporate Probation Under the New Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE LJ. 2017, 2036
(1992) (stating that predictability in sentencing scheme fosters deterrence).
134. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 53, at 44 (explaining that doctrine of stare decisis
requires "treating like cases alike"); Schauer, supra note 103, at 595-96 (stating that treating
similar cases differently is arbitrary and unfair).
135. See Schauer, supra note 103, at 596 (arguing that fairness is achieved by consistency in
law).
136. See Chapman, supra note 53, at 44 (explaining that doctrine of stare decisis applies if
cases are similar).
137. CARRINGTON ET AL, supra note 43, at 11-12.
138. See Aguirre v. United States, 956 F.2d 1166 (Table), text available on Westlaw, 1992 WL
38624, at *5 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he seeds of chaos are sown if a single court prances off in
sharply conflicting directions.... Thus, absent unusual or exceptional circumstances, judges
of coordinate jurisdiction within a jurisdiction should follow brethren judge's rulings."), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 968 (1993); Wald, supra note 105, at 768-69 (stating that courts should strive
toward uniformity in decisions); see also supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text (citing sources
that explain need for development of coherent body of law).
139. Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the Federal
Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 72, 72 (stating that courts of appeals employ "self-imposed,
'prior-panel rules' that bind three judge panels to follow earlier panels' holdings," and
explaining how monitoring of prior panels' holdings burdens courts).
140. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 417 U.S. 622, 626 (1974) (stating that purpose of
en banc court is maintenance of intracircuit uniformity).
141. See PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 111 (1984) (stating that judges decide cases
according to preexisting legal standards, not personal desire or whim).
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standards rather than personal whim .... U]udges... decid[e]
cases by reference to external legal standards .... Thus, the court
is doubly constrained: it must reach decisions that accord with
preexisting standards (it must judge), and it has no choice about
the standards to be used in performing that task (it must judge
according to law).142
Indeed, the idea that courts "should decide cases in accordance with
general, public, pre-existing laws" is an absolute prerequisite to
legitimacy of a legal system, and is essential to securing the benefits
of personal liberty.43
In sum, preparation and publication of opinions promotes
certainty, predictability, and stability in the law because those values
depend on the complexities and subtleties of the court's reasoning,
not merely on the result. Opinions also advance consistency and
fidelity to law, for new decisions can only be consistent with, and
faithful to, existing law if that law can be found. Making the law
widely available permits citizens to conform their conduct to the law,
allows attorneys to assess accurately the viability of potential claims,
and guides future appellate and lower courtjudges in deciding similar
disputes. a44
D. Opinions as Essential Tools in Research and Analysis,
A published opinion is the "working tool of lawyers and the
building block of judges."45  Opinion writing facilitates the
decisionmaking process by sharpening analysis,146 and by imposing
a sense of responsibility and discipline on judges. 47 When writing
opinions, judges must determine whether their decisions are
142. Id.; see also Keating, supra note 101, at 3-10 (explaining that three basic premises of
political thought support view that courts make decisions based on preexisting law); Shelton M.
Vaughn, Preface,JudicialDecisionmaking. The Role of Text, Precedent, and the Rule of Law, 17 HARV.
J.L & PUB. POL'Y xi, xiii (1994) (stating that judges must practice judicial self-restraint and
"fidelity to the law").
143. Keating, supra note 101, at 4.
144. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 248 (arguing that law gives people notice as to what is
acceptable behavior and projects future rulings); Loughran, supra note 118, at 3-4 (explaining
that attorneys rely on past decisions to advise clients and that judges rely on them to simplify
decisionmaking process).
145. Reid, supra note 2, at 59.
146. See FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLEcIONS FROM THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE BENCH 57-58 (1980) (explaining that preparation of written opinion is strong device
for assuring accuracy of logic); see also BAKER, supra note 7, at 120 (arguing that one purpose of
decision writing is to require writer to fully reason through to conclusion).
147. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 111, at 26 (noting that preparation of opinions "affords not
only back-check and cross-check on any contemplated decision by way of continuity with the law
to date but provides also a due measure of caution by way of contemplation of effects ahead");
Wald, supra note 105, at 768 (stating that written opinions should lend courts legitimacy, permit
public evaluation, and impose discipline on judges).
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consistent with and faithful to prior decisions, and whether the
opinions establish certain and predictable rules for future cases. 14 8
Published opinions are the tangible evidence of the law's evolution
and foreshadow its future development."4 Without published
opinions, the basic tasks of legal research and analysis would be
impossible for attorneys and judges.' 50
Attorneys and judges perform legal research not as an end in itself,
but rather to locate rules that guide conduct, allocate benefits, or
decide controversies."' Judges apply the law to the facts of the case
at hand to resolve the dispute between the parties, and to establish or
clarify the law for future disputes.152 Attorneys apply existing law to
predict and advocate the outcome of a client's dispute, and to advise
the client on an appropriate course of action. 3 With opinions in
hand, ajudge or attorney can undertake the detailed factual analysis
and comparison that is required to evaluate the merits of the facts
presented.
The law upon which this sort of analysis is based emerges from the
application of legal norms to the particular facts of the earlier cases
now consulted as precedent.'54 The law is embodied in the reports
of those cases.155 Unless the instant case and the precedent case are
identical, the rule formulated in the precedent case is transformed by
application to a new and relevantly different situation.' Distin-
guishing cases based on subtle differences in the facts is a "'hallmark
of stare decisis"';-" "in [the] art [of distinguishing cases] is ... to
be found much of the true essence of case law."5' Thus, the
148. See CoFFrN, supra note 146, at 57 (stating that written opinion is product of judge's
attempt to explain facts, law, logic, and policy implications of particular case).
149. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 111, at 26 (stating that opinions show how similar cases
should be decided in future).
150. See generally Kempin, supra note 74 (describing how modem methods of research and
analysis differ from those of lawyers and judges prior to mid-19th century).
151. See Berring, supra note 76, at 12 (stating that legal profession depends on finding,
reading, and analyzing cases).
152. See CoFFIN, supra note 146, at 52 (explaining how judges apply legal principles to facts
in deciding cases); POSNER, supra note 42, at 247 (stating thatjudges both make decisions based
on precedent and create precedent).
153. Cf Hinderks & Leben, supra note 10, at 212-14 (illustrating how unpublished opinions
and noncitation rules create practical problems for attorneys' efforts to analyze law and advise
clients).
154. See Berring, supra note 76, at 12 (explaining that legal theorists analyze case law by
relating cases to one another).
155. See Berring, supra note 76, at 13 (noting that legal profession considersjudicial decisions
primary sources).
156. See Chapman, supra note 53, at 67 (describing how prior rule is transformed whenjudge
applies it to instant case).
157. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1186 (citation omitted).
158. LLEWELLYN, supra note 79, at 13.
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availability of the facts and analysis of prior cases is vital to the process
of applying the law to current cases. 59 Knowledge of the result
alone is not enough to support the process of legal reasoning.
It is important to take a broad view of the ways in which opinions
are used in practice. A decision does far more than resolve the
dispute between the parties or correct the errors of the court below.
Appellate decisions are "typically stated in general terms," and their
authority is intended to guide the resolution of like cases in the
future.16 Opinions provide a wealth of information, including the
rule announced in the decision, the reasoning on which it rests, and
the specific facts that establish the parameters of the rule's applica-
tion. 16 1
But opinions do much more. For example, readers can compare
and evaluate the majority opinion alongside any concurring or
dissenting opinions in order to determine precisely what the court
decided and how far its decision may extend in future cases. 62
Opinions facilitate the discovery of conflicts in the law of the
circuit. 63  The ability to study a court's opinions is accordingly
critical to developing a sophisticated understanding of what the law
is.
Opinions also permit readers to view the law in historical context.
Insofar as opinions identify the precedents on which the court relied,
they allow readers to form an understanding of the law's maturity. 64
In addition, the highly specialized citators on which legal research
depends allow readers to gauge the continuing vitality of a decision
159. See Robel, supra note 9, at 947 (describing lawyers' practice of examining opinions to
determine how courts apply important precedents).
160. Chapman, supra note 53, at 43.
161. See LLEivELLYN, supra note 111, at 26 (stating that opinions serve many functions such
as providing reader with reasoning of court and precedent court applied).
162. See LLEvELLYN, supra note 111, at 26 (arguing that dissent forces accountability of
current law). For an example of the phenomenon where the dissenting view is eventually
adopted by a majority, seeJoHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTmITIONAL LAW 957-68
(4th ed. 1991) (citing cases and describing evolution of "clear and present danger" test in
freedom of speech cases from early dissents ofJustices Holmes and Brandeis to adoption of test
(with modifications) by majority of Supreme Court).
163. CARRINGTON Er AL, supra note 43, at 38 (discussing conflicts in law of Ninth Circuit that
are only detectable with aid of unpublished opinions, which forecloses presentment to, and
resolution of conflict by, court); see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1203 (arguing
that noncitation rules lower possibility for review intended to resolve conflicts among circuits);
David L. Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of Stare Decisis, 61 MARoQ. L. REv. 581, 583
(1978) (stating that unpublished opinions in California include "'not-inconsiderable body of law
dealing with novel points and giving rise to conflicts among decisions.'" (quoting Gideon
Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. BJ. 386, 443 (1973))).
164. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1190 (stating that later opinions on similar
case clarify earlier principles).
1995]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:757
based on the frequency and approval with which it is cited.' 65
Often, the determination whether or not a particular opinion is law-
making cannot be made until years later, when further developments
in the law demonstrate what the authoring judge could not fore-
cast. 6 ' Moreover, the lasting authority of a decision depends largely
on the quality of its reasoning, which can be evaluated only by
reading the opinion. At a minimum, the tasks of researching and
applying the law require that the law be findable and knowable, that
the precedential value of prior decisions be ascertainable with some
degree of reliability, and that prior decisions provide guidance for
future cases. These conditions, in turn, can be satisfied only by the
publication ofjudicial opinions stating the facts of the case, the issues
considered, the court's reasoning, and the result.
Many lawyers assume that appellate courts publish all their
opinions,16 7 a once-valid assumption.'6 Until recently, lawyers
who researched all the published opinions of the relevantjurisdiction
(and validated their findings through citators) could be confident that
they had conducted adequate case law research. The cases described
in Part III demonstrate that selective publication, summary disposi-
tion, and vacatur upon settlement invalidate these basic assumptions
about legal research. Researchers must now look beyond published
opinions for authority, 69 and must independently evaluate the
precedential status of their findings in light of the noncitation
rules.170
165. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1190 (stating that growth in number of cases
on certain issue increases assurance as to legal consequences); see also Nichols, supra note 17,
at 916 (noting that it can be persuasive to make arguments based on long line of precedent, but
arguments based on frequency of citation are not available when Sdecision to be cited was not
published).
166. See Nichols, supra note 17, at 921 (stating that judges cannot anticipate problems their
opinions will be used to solve); In re Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
955 F.2d 36, 38 (10th Cir. 1992) (arguing that future developments reveal opinion's
significance); In re Amendment of Section (Rule) 809.23 (3), stats., 456 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Wis.
1990) (AbrahamsonJ., dissenting) (arguing that all rulings are precedent).
167. COHEN ET AL., supra note 95, at 42 (stating that many researchers wrongly assume that
opinions in all cases considered are published).
168. SeeJ. MYRONJACOBSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 36 (3d
ed. 1985) (noting that nearly all opinions of courts of appeals were once published); see also
supra note 14 (describing declining publication rates).
169. See In re Rues, 955 F.2d at 38 (noting that, if experience showed that unpublished
rulings truly added nothing to law, lawyers would only research published opinions).
170. See id. at 37 (arguing that forbidding citation of prior decisions may "have overtones of
a constitutional infringement"). Judge Holloway of the Tenth Circuit believes that:
[A]11 rulings of [the] court are precedents, like it or not, and [the court] cannot
consign any of them to oblivion by merely banning their citation.... No matter how
insignificant a prior ruling might appear to us, any litigant who can point to [it] and
demonstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it should be able to do so as a matter
of essential justice and fundamental fairness.
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Ill. THE IMPACT ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Selective publication, summary disposition, and vacatur affect the
judicial process and the practice of law in numerous ways. 71
Commentators suggest that practices which reduce the availability of
opinions confer an unfair advantage on certain classes of litigants over
others, 172 and increase litigants' costs and the costs of operating the
judicial system. 73 It also appears that cases without published
opinions are less likely to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 74
Without discounting the cogency of such observations, this Article
focuses on a different issue: the manner in which all three practices
affect the judicial process and the practice of law by altering the way
we use legal authorities to resolve disputes.
A. A Secret Body of Law
As Part II.C argues, if the values underlying our legal system are to
operate effectively, the law must be findable and knowable. Selective
publication makes it difficult to find the law. According to Judge
Wald, unpublished opinions "increase the risk of nonuniformity; allow
difficult issues to be swept under the carpet; and result in a body of
'secret law' practically inaccessible to many lawyers."" For exam-
Id.
171. See id. (arguing that all rulings, including unpublished ones, are precedent and need
to be cited if necessary); see also Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 8 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that summary dispositions are disrespectful to parties and courts);John P.
Stevens, Address to the Illinois State Bar Association's Centennial Dinner, 65 ILL BJ. 508, 510-14
(1977) (describing ways in which summary disposition affects practice of law); Wald, supra note
105, at 781-83 (describing costs and benefits of summary dispositions);Jack B. Weinstein, Factors
Determining theDegree of Public Availability ofJudicial Opinions, 2 N.Y.U. ENvrL. LJ. 244, 245 (1993)
(describing selective publication of federal court of appeals opinions as "deleterious").
172. See, e.g., Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of FederalAppellate Court Opinions, 6JUST. SYS.
J. 405, 414 (1981) (arguing that unpublished opinions are more readily available to institutional
litigants, large firms, and other powerful organizations); Nichols, supra note 17, at 918 (stating
that Federal Circuit has special duty to minimize advantage of lawyers who have better
knowledge of unpublished decisions); Robel, supra note 9, at 946 (articulating fear that some
litigants who appear before courts often will have better access to opinions).
173. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1194 (stating that purported monetary
savings from nonpublication will be lessened if citation of unpublished decisions is permitted).
174. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1203 (positing that Supreme Court is less
likely to review cases with unpublished opinions because unpublished opinions are not as
detailed as reported opinions).
175. National Classification Comm'nv. United States, 765 F.2d 164,173 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
see also County of Los Angeles v. Kling, 474 U.S. 936, 938 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
summary reversal) (arguing that court of appeals' decision not to publish opinion was wrong
because it resulted in insufficient unpublished opinion that did not deeply analyze court's
decision); United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that summary
affirmances have no stare decisis effect due to potential for development of "secret law" inherent
in use of decisions alone without court's supporting reasoning); POSNER, supra note 42, at 120-26
(explaining difficulties that unpublished opinions bring to practice of law); Wald, supra note
THE AMERICAN UNIvERsrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:757
pie, although subsequent panels are bound to follow the prior
decisions of other panels of the same court,176 it is not possible to
do so (except by happenstance) if prior judicial decisions are
unavailable to judges in later cases.Y Two unacceptable results are
imaginable: the subsequent panel, unaware of a prior unpublished
decision, might reach a cbntrary result, creating a conflict in the law
of the circuit; or the subsequent panel might decline to publish an
opinion to avoid calling attention to the fact that its decision conflicts
with the holding of a prior panel. 78
Moreover, to the extent that unpublished decisions are binding
authority or reliable evidence of the way the court will rule, selective
publication frustrates attorneys' attempts to fulfill their Rule 11
obligation to perform a reasonable inquiry before filing a complaint
105, at 781-84 (arguing thatjudges should write opinions for cases that make law).
176. See United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 927, 930 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that panels are
bound by decisions of prior panels "absent en banc reconsideration or superseding contrary
decision of Supreme Court"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994).
177. See Nichols, supra note 17, at 914 (stating that author, a federal judge, never used
unpublished opinion to decide case).
178. Not all circuits apply the prior-panel rule in the same fashion. The Third and Sixth
Circuits consider themselves bound only by the reported decisions of prior panels. Robinson
v. Jiffy Executive Limousine Co., 4 F.3d 237, 240-41 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Hardin, 9
F.3d 1548 (Table), text available on Westlaw, 1993 WL 460766, at *5 (6th Cir. 1993) (Nelson, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1323 (1994). Circuits that apply the prior panel rule only
to reported cases leave themselves vulnerable to the criticism that unreported decisions are used
to suppress precedent or hide unpopular decisions, and that the court, in refusing to be bound
by them, flouts the values of consistency and fidelity to authority.
The other circuits claim to apply the prior panel rule whether or not the earlier decision was
reported. Killion, 7 F.3d at 930; Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 992 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir.
1993); Clowv. United States Dep't ofHous. & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 616 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991)
(per curiam) (citing United States v. Washington, 872 F.2d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 1989)); Busby v.
Crown Supply, 896 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1990);Jusino v. Zayas, 875 F.2d 936, 993 (1st Cir.
1989); Evans v. Clarke, 868 F.2d 267, 268-69 (8th Cir. 1989); Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,
864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); Farrish v. Mississippi State
Parole Bd., 836 F.2d 969, 975 (5th Cir. 1988); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(l1th Cir. 1981); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1369 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); Joly, 493 F.2d at 675-76; see also In re Rules of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that court's duty is to
apply prior rulings).
Circuits that attempt to apply the prior panel rule to all earlier decisions run into the
difficulty, described by Judge Tjoflat, of monitoring the law of the circuit. Tjoflat, supra note
139, at 72. The difficulty of keeping abreast of a court's decisions increases dramatically as the
court grows in membership. On a court of 28 active members, there are 3276 possible panel
combinations, while on a court with 11 active judges there are only 165 possible panel
combinations. Id. On large circuits, each member sits with each other member only
infrequently, and participates in relatively few of the court's decisions. The courts of appeals
in 1993 each reached between 1365 (First Circuit) and 8966 (Ninth Circuit) decisions, 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, tbl. B, far more than the human mind can assimilate. See Robel,
supra note 9, at 944 (stating that task of monitoring decisions is particularly difficult in light of
fact that some circuits do not routinely circulate unreported decisions to judges not on panel).
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in federal court.179 Attorneys are expected to locate not only
authority supporting their claims, but also adverse authority and
recent changes in the law.' The reasonableness of the inquiry
depends on circumstances such as the clarity of the law, the complexi-
ty of the legal issue, and the resources available to the attorney.18 1
Selective publication makes it difficult to assess the clarity or
ambiguity of the law or the complexity of the legal issue by creating
"secret" law. This practice also contributes to the imbalance in
resources available to attorneys by effectively making certain opinions
available only through high-cost commercial databases. 8 2  Even if
the argument that there is "too much law" is credible, selective
publication does not solve the problem. It does not reduce the
amount of law, but actually creates an additional, less accessible body
of law that must be consulted, making research more difficult and
raising the cost of litigation.
Summary dispositions also contribute to the difficulty of finding the
law by providing insufficient information about what the court actually
decided. These dispositions state only the result in the case, and
provide no information about the facts or the reasoning on which the
decision is grounded. The Supreme Court, discussing its own
summary dispositions, has noted that "ascertaining the reach and
content of summary actions may itself present issues of real sub-
stance."'83 In Supreme Court practice, summary affirmances uphold
the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was
reached. 184 The courts of appeals have characterized the import of
their summary dispositions in similar terms. 8 5 When courts affirm
or reverse without opinions, they create law that researchers cannot
find.18 6
179. See FED. R. CV. P. 11(b) and STANDARD D(12); see also Hinderks & Leben, supra note
10, at 213-14 (arguing that there are situations where attorney must review unpublished
decisions in order to fulfill duties of reasonable care and diligence).
180. See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LIGATION ABUSE 130-34
(1994) (explaining that attorney's investigation into law must be timely, thorough, and
reasonable under circumstances).
181. Id. at 132-34.
182. See Robel, supra note 9, at 955 (discussing advantages gained by frequent litigants who
know holdings of court and have access to unpublished opinions).
183. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345 n.14 (1975).
184. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
185. See Quad Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that summary affirmances are not to be taken as appellate court's adoption of district
court's reasoning, as affirmance could have been on any appropriate ground); Burgin v.
Henderson, 536 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that summary affirmance has no
precedential value and should not suggest to districtjudge that his earlier opinion was correct).
186. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Morgan Guarantee Trust Co. v. Blum exemplifies how a
summary affirmance creates "secret" law. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Blum, 649 F.2d 342 (5th
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The following examples illustrate the seriousness of the courts of
appeals' creation of a body of "secret law" by failing to publish
opinions in important cases that make new law or modify established
law. In National Classification Commission v. United States (National
),187 the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the
National Classification Commission's construction of a statute. 88 In
a subsequent case involving the same parties (National I1), the court
held that its disposition in National I precluded petitioners from
relitigating the issues. 18 9
Along with her opinion for the panel in National II, Judge Wald
filed a separate statement voicing concerns about the propriety of the
court's decision not to publish an opinion in National L190 Judge
Wald argued that National I was a "case of first impression involving
a substantial question of statutory interpretation," which required an
"examination of Congress' purpose and intent," and which would be
of widespread public interest.19' Cases of first impression and cases
involving legal issues of widespread public interest explicitly merit
publication under the District of Columbia Circuit's "Plan for
Publication of Opinions."192 Despite the obvious applicability of
these criteria, the panel failed to publish its opinion in National L
Cir. 1981). Blum concludes with the statement that "[a]s to the remainder of the issues on
appeal, we affirm on the basis of the reasoning of the court below." Id. at 346. This statement
signals that the reasoning of the court below was sound and implies that the appellate court
would adopt the same reasoning in future cases. The Fifth Circuit's opinion, however, provides
no clue as to what that reasoning was, and states in a footnote that "[w]e need not quote
portions of the unpublished opinion below relevant to these issues since they have no
precedential value." Id. at 346 n.5. Thus, the Fifth Circuit endorsed reasoning that is
unavailable in its opinion or in a published opinion below. Readers of Blum are deprived of the
opportunity to know what reasoning the court found persuasive or what, precisely, the court
held.
187. 737 F.2d 1206 (Table) (D.C. Cir. 1984).
188. National Classification Comm'n v. United States, 737 F.2d 1206, 1206 (Table) (D.C. Cir.
1984) (National I).
189. National Classification Comm'n v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(National II).
190. Id. at 172. Judge Wald further noted that "the present case testifies to the unfortunate
by-products of the overuse of this rapidly growing mode of disposition." Id.
191. Id. at 174.
192. The District of Columbia Circuit's Plan for Publication of Opinions (adopted Apr. 17,
1973), provides that an opinion will be published if:
a. It establishes a rule of law on a point of first impression for the court, or alters or
modifies a rule of law previously announced.
b. It involves a legal issue of unusual or continuing public interest.
c. It criticizes existing law.
d. It is considered a significant contribution to legal literature, e.g. through historical
resolution of an apparent conflict in opinions, by furnishing an analysis of the rationale
and policy or content of a rule of law.
e. It applies an established rule of law to a factual situation significantly different from
that in published cases.
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Similarly, the Supreme Court recently decided United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co., 193 which involved the broadcasting of commercials
for lotteries.194 Neither the district nor appellate .court opinion was
published. Writing for the majority, Justice White "deem[ed] it
remarkable and unusual that although the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed ajudgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitu-
tional as applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its
judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion."1 9
One would assume that a decision holding a federal statute
unconstitutional merits publication, but the Fourth Circuit's rule does
not explicitly cover this situation.196 A decision holding a federal
statute unconstitutional, however, arguably warrants publication under
the Fourth Circuit's rules because it "alters," "modifies," or "criticizes"
existing law, albeit not case law.197  The Fourth Circuit's Edge
Broadcasting holding creates a conflict between two branches of
government, if not two circuits. 19 Moreover, the case turns on First
Amendment speech issues and involves accommodation of neighbor-
ing States' inconsistent regulation of broadcasters, which are matters
of "continuing public interest."1 9 Under any reasonable reading of
the Fourth Circuit's publication rule, the opinion ought to have been
published.
200
Responding to critics of selective publication and summary
disposition, judges assert that the development of the law is not
impeded when redundant, straightforward, or unimportant cases are
193. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993), aftg956 F.2d 263 (Table) (per curiam), text available on Westlaw,
1992 WL 35795 (4th Cir. 1992).
194. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993), a f'g 956 F.2d 263
(Table) (per curiam), text available on Westlaw, 1992 WL 35795 (4th Cir. 1992).
195. Id. at 2702 n.3.
196. See 4TH CiR. LO.P. 36.4. The rule provides for publication only if the opinion satisfies
one or more of the following standards for publication:
i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law within this
Circuit; or
ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
iii. It criticizes existing law;, or
iv. It contains an historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; or
v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a conflict with a
decision in another circuit.
Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. 4TH CR. R. 36.4(ii).
200. Two additional facts suggest that the case was not easy or routine. The panel's decision
was not unanimous; one judge disagreed with the majority's application of a leading Supreme
Court case, see Edge Broadcasting, 1992 WL 35795, at *4 (Widener, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's application of test for determining constitutionally permitted restrictions on
commercial speech), and it took the court 16 months to decide the case, see id. at *1 (stating
that case was argued before Fourth Circuit on Oct. 31, 1990, and decided on Feb. 27, 1992).
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unaccompanied by full, published opinions. 21  The intent of the
publication rules is, accordingly, to ensure that "law-making" opinions
are published, leaving unpublished only those opinions that add
nothing to the development of the law.20 2 These rules, however,
have failed to secure that result, either because they are unclear or
because the courts fail to follow them.0 3 Judges exercise consider-
able discretion, even under the courts' publication guidelines, in
deciding when opinions should be prepared or published, and thus,
which decisions become law. Judges cannot accurately determine at
the time of disposition which cases require published opinions.
Indeed, Justice Stevens states that this practice "rests on a false
premise" in that it "assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the
quality and importance of his own work product."2 °2 Likewise,
Judge Holloway notes that "when we make our ad hoc determination
that a ruling is not significant enough for publication, we are not in
as informed a position as we might believe. Future developments may
well reveal that the ruling is significant indeed."2 5
Opinions that acknowledge conflicts or uncertainty in the law of the
circuit are not always published,2°6 although the existence of a
conflict should be grounds for publication under any reasonable
interpretation of the rules.2 7  Furthermore, cases in which the
201. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 971-72 (5th Cir.
1970) (explaining Fifth Circuit's adoption of rule permitting dispositions without opinion);
Nichols, supra note 17, at 916 (explaining that motivation behind selective publication is desire
to avoid publishing decisions that lack precedential or other significant utility).
202. See Nichols, supra note 17, at 916 (stating that selective publication is intended to curb
publication of opinions considered redundant or irrelevant to law).
203. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrFE ON PROCEDURES
CONCERNING UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DisrIcr OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (June 8, 1984) (reporting that one-third to one-half of D.C.
Circuit's cases each year are disposed of without published opinions, and concluding that 40%
of unpublished decisions arguably should have been published under court's criteria); see also
Hinderks & Leben, supra note 10, at 188-211 (discussing inconsistent and incorrect application
of nonpublication rules); Hoffman, supra note 172, at 418 (concluding that at least some
potentially valuable decisions go unpublished); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 17, at 1192-93
nn.132-34 (giving examples of unpublished but law-making opinions).
204. Stevens, supra note 171, at 508; see also In re Rules of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, 955 F.2d 36, 38 (acknowledging that court often changes its mind about publica-
tion).
205. Rules, 955 F.2d at 38.
206. See Granite State Ins. Co. v. Tandy Corp., 986 F.2d 94, 95 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting
conflict among Fifth Circuit cases regarding whether abstention factors should apply to
declaratory judgment actions). The Fifth Circuit's affirmance in Granite State was originally
published only in a table opinion. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Tandy Corp., 959 F.2d 968 (Table)
(5th Cir. 1992); see also Hoffman, supra note 172, at 413 n.9 (citing studies that discuss
"apparently significant unpublished memoranda").
207. See Hoffman, supra note 172, at 415-16 (discussing practice of circulating unpublished
opinions among judges in order to prevent intracircuit conflict, and suggesting that this practice
undermines rationale for nonpublication).
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appellate court reverses the court below, or in which the appellate
panel's decision is not unanimous, would seem to require publication
as "law-making" decisions even though the rules do not explicitly
address these situations. If the district court erred in its application
of the law, the law is probably unclear. Similarly, the presence of
concurring or dissenting opinions usually indicates disagreement or
uncertainty about the applicable law."' These factors strongly
suggest that the courts of appeals should publish opinions in such
cases.
B. Uncertainty About Precedential Status
Even if the law embodied in unpublished opinions can be found
through online databases or other means, its value to the researcher
may be unclear. Selective publication practices, and the accompany-
ing noncitation rules, make for very uncertain precedent and
complicate legal research. In at least two circuits, citation of
unpublished dispositions is "disfavored" but allowed,2" an unaccept-
ably ambiguous statement of precedential effect. Furthermore,
different panels of the same circuit, deciding similar cases and
applying the same publication criteria, sometimes reach opposite
conclusions regarding the precedential status of their opinions."'
As a result, researchers must independently undertake the difficult
task of assessing the precedential value of unpublished opinions.
While publication formerly signified precedential status, court rules
establishing the circumstances under which unpublished opinions may
be cited have muddied the waters. Publication is no longer synony-
mous with precedential status. Moreover, "publication" as used by the
208. The circuits have adopted varying rules about who makes the publication decision: the
author of the panel's decision, the entire panel, the authors of separate opinions, or the entire
court. SeeD.C. CHR. R 36(a) (1); D.C. Cm. I.O.P. XII.B (court); 1sT CIR. R. 36.2(b) (at least one
judge on panel); 2D CiR. R. 0.23 (at least one judge on panel); 3D CiR. I.O.P. 5.1.2 (unanimous
panel); 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.4 (author or majority ofjoiningjudges); 5TH CiR. R. 47.5.2 (at least
one judge on panel); 6TH CR. R. 24(b) (majority of panel); 7TH CIR. R. 53(d) (majority of
panel); 8TH CI. R. 47B (publication decision made by entire court); 9TH CIR. I.O.P. E(8)
(entire court); 10TH IR. R. 36.1 (court); 11TH CIR. R. 36 (court, but majority of panel can
subsequently publish previously unpublished opinion); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (at least one judge
on panel). But see Nichols, supra note 17, at 925 (noting that, as dissenting judge, Nichols would
not avail himself of Federal Circuit's rule allowing dissentingjudges to force publication of panel
decision, because by doing so he would be giving precedential effect to decision with which he
disagreed).
209. 6TH CR. R. 10(f); General Order of Nov. 29, 1993, supra note 17 (suspending Tenth
Circuit Rule 36.3, thereby allowing, but disfavoring, citation to unpublished decisions).
210. Compare Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. Argus Chem. Corp., 873 F.2d 1451 (Table) (Fed. Cir.
1989) (failing to publish opinion vacating findings on validity of patent after finding of
noninfringement) with Morton Int'l v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(publishing opinion after finding of noninfringement).
19951
792 THE AMECAN UNvErIy LAW RmE w [Vol. 44:757
courts of appeals still refers to print sources, not to the overall
dissemination of the document in a variety of formats.21 In the
earliest days of selective publication this dilemma was not acute, for
researchers seldom found unpublished opinions. Unpublished
opinions, however, are now widely available, particularly through
online legal research services.213 Subscribers to these services can
find unpublished opinions just as easily as published ones. 214  By
virtue of their widespread availability, regardless of their citability,
unpublished opinions have become important sources of legal
information that researchers cannot ignore if they hope to remain
competitive in the marketplace for clients and, indeed, to meet
standards of effective advocacy. Attorneys cannot run the risk that
their opponents will gain an advantage by researching an additional
body of law.
As for the precedential value of summary dispositions, the courts
themselves are in disagreement. The Supreme Court clearly accords
precedential value to its summary dispositions, but has recognized the
211. "Publication" seems to refer only to print sources because unpublished opinions are
regularly available through commercial online services such as Westlaw and LEXIS. In addition
to making unpublished opinions available on commercial online services, the courts of appeals
have begun to disseminate their opinions electronically over public-access bulletin board systems
in an effort to make opinions available to the public more easily and more quickly than they
could be obtained as slip opinions through the clerk's office, and at less cost than through the
commercial online services. See Roy G. Nelson, Revolution in Court Technology, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 9,
1993, at 4 (discussing federal appellate courts' use of electronic bulletin board systems for
dissemination of slip opinions); Alan J. Rothman, Judidal Computing's WinningAppeal N.Y. LJ.,
May 12, 1992, at 4 (discussing access of New York state judges to electronic bulletin boards for
New York State Court of Appeals).
212. See United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing problems of
unequal access to unpublished opinions); CARRINGTON E AL., supra note 43, at 36 (discussing
unfair advantage held by attorneys located near courts and other institutions retaining
unpublished opinions on file); Nichols, supra note 17, at 913 (noting popular perception of
unfair impediments facing attorneys who lack access to unpublished opinions).
The major exception would have been major or institutional litigants, such as insurance
companies or the Government, who appeared frequently before certain courts and could
maintain private files of relevant opinions to which they had access by virtue of their status as
parties to the litigation. Until recently, it is unlikely that anyone thought it necessary to research
unpublished opinions, and it would have been nearly impossible to do so because these opinions
were not included in the West Digest system-the sole extant nationwide index ofjudicial
opinions.
Slip opinions are generally available upon request from the clerk of court, but one must know
that a relevant decision exists in order to request it. Slip opinions are usually available on a
subscription basis only to a few major law libraries within the circuit. The subscription service
may or may not include unpublished decisions.
213. See supra note 10 (discussing availability of unpublished opinions on Westlaw and
LEXIS).
214. In fact, at least on LEXIS, unpublished federal court opinions are retrieved along with
published decisions as a matter of course. On Westlaw, the same is true for courts of appeals
opinions. For federal district court opinions, however, the researcher must select a database that
includes unpublished opinions if they are to be included in the search result.
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difficulty of ascertaining the reach or content of those decisions.21
The courts of appeals have adopted divergent rules about summary
dispositions." 6  Rules granting precedential value to summary
dispositions are based on a flawed premise-that the precedential
value of a decision can be determined when only the result and not
the reasoning is known. In other words, the question is not simply
whether the decision is precedential, but whether it establishes a
precedent for a particular proposition. The naked statement that a
decision was affirmed or reversed cannot answer this question,
regardless of whether the court considers the decision "precedential."
Vacatur also creates confusion regarding precedential value. When
a court, in a published opinion, affirms or reverses the court below,
or overrules its own prior decision, the import of its action is clear.
Even when a court recedes from a previous holding without overrul-
ing it, the published opinion, including any concurring or dissenting
opinions, sheds light on the scope of the rule thereafter. When a
court simply orders a prior judgment vacated upon settlement
between the parties, however, the validity of the vacated judgment is
shrouded in mystery. Vacatur creates "quasi-law."21 7  When courts
vacate prior judgments, they leave subsequent researchers to wonder
whether the reasoning of the vacated decisions is sound. 8 A
judgment is an event that, once it occurs, cannot be redacted19
regardless of vacatur, but vacatur may deprive it of its status as law.
As is the case with unpublished opinions and summary dispositions,
courts disagree about the propriety of relying on a vacated opinion,
even for persuasive effect.220 In a 1961 case, the Supreme Court
stated that a vacated lower court judgment establishes no binding
precedent, and implied that the lower court's vacated opinion would
be deprived of any precedential value.2 ' Justice Powell, however,
has taken the view that the statements of the lower court continue to
have precedential value until the court decides to the contrary, even
though the vacated judgment can no longer be said to be the law of
215. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's difficulty in
determining scope of precedential value of summary dispositions and their underlying
reasoning).
216. See supra note 20 (citing and discussing various circuits' rules about summary
disposition).
217. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1511.
218. Fisch, supra note 22, at 193.
219. See Resnik, supra note 10, at 1511.
220. See Resnik, supra note 10, at 1507-09 (discussing approaches of courts of appeals as to
whether and to what extent they should rely on vacated opinions).
221. A.L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 329 n.11 (1961).
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the case.222 Although the Supreme Court recently raised this issue
in oral arguments,2" it did not decide the issue. 24
Two recent cases offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to
rule on the use of vacatur upon settlement. In the 1992-93 Term, the
Court granted certiorari in Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S.
Philips Corp.21 Philips sued Izumi and Windmere for patent in-
fringement, and also sued Windmere for unfair competition. 26
Windmere countersued on an antitrust claim and was awarded $89
million.227 While appeal was pending on the antitrust claim, Philips
and Windmere agreed to settle.2 Philips agreed to pay Windmere
$57 million, and the parties jointly moved to vacate the judgments
below.229  Izumi intervened to block the vacatur and preserve the
ruling in favor of Windmere, whose defense costs Izumi had paid.3 0
In a per curiam opinion the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.2 1 Thus, the propriety of allowing unsuccess-
ful litigants to petition the court to vacate an unfavorable precedent
as part of a settlement agreement remained uncertain.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented from the
dismissal in Izumi.12  Justice Stevens roundly condemned the
vacatur practice:
While it is appropriate to vacate a judgment when mootness
deprives the appellant of an opportunity for review,.., that
justification does not apply to mootness achieved by purchase.
Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the
legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of
222. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 646 n.10 (1979) (PowellJ., dissenting).
223. This question was on the minds of several members of the Court during oral argument.
See Arguments Before the C7our7 Courts and Procedure; Automatic Vacatur Rule, 63 U.S.LW. 3279-80
(Oct. 11, 1994) (reporting "extended questioning" about whether Ninth Circuit's opinion would
remain persuasive precedent or become interesting law review article, and whether it could still
be given collateral estoppel or resjudicata effect).
224. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct 386 (1994).
225. 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993).
226. See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct 425, 425
(1993).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 426.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. Although the Court noted significant disagreement among the circuits with respect
to the vacatur practice, the Court did not reach the merits of the case because it would have had
to address the question of Izumi's right to intervene, which was "neither presented in the
petition for certiorari nor fairly included within the one question that was presented." Id. at
425.
232. See id. at 428-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that intervention issue was fairly
included within question about propriety of Federal Circuit's vacatur practice, and stating
concern about impact of vacatur on both third-party interests in litigation and public interest
in finality ofjudgments).
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private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the
public interest would be served by a vacar. ... The public
interest in preserving the work product of the judicial system
should always at least be weighed in the balance before such a
motion is granted.-5
This Term, the Court went out of its way to decide a vacatur case,
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership.2" Bonner Mall
involved default on real-estate taxes." The day before the sched-
uled foreclosure sale of the affected property, Bonner filed a Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition, along with a reorganization plan that
depended on the availability of the "new value exception" to the
absolute priority rule. 6 The Bankruptcy Court ruled that the new
value exception was unavailable." 7 The District Court reversed, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court decision.238 Bancorp
then filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted,239 but while
the appeal was pending the parties adopted a consensual plan of
reorganization, settling the case.' Bancorp then requested that
the Supreme Court vacate the Ninth Circuit's judgment.241 The
Court set the vacatur question for briefing and oral argument.
242
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that "mootness by reason
of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under re-
view."243 The Court described vacatur as an "extraordinary remedy,"
to which petitioner must demonstrate equitable entitlement.
244
Justice Scalia offered several rationales for this result. First, the use
of vacatur as a "refined form of collateral attack on the judgment
would ... disturb the orderly operation of the federal judicial
system."245 Second, the Court should not vacate cases on the basis
of an "assumption" that cases accepted for review are likely to be re-
versed.246 Third, litigants and the public are best served by preserv-
233. Id. at 431-32 (citations omitted).
234. 63 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1994) (explaining that after case was settled and U.S.
Bancorp had requested that Supreme Court vacate Ninth Circuit's decision, Court directed
parties to brief issue of mootness where parties voluntarily settle).
235. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 389 (1994).
236. Id.
23 7. Id.
238. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 142 B.R. 911 (D. Idaho 1992); In re Bonner Mall
Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993).
239. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994).
240. Bonner MaU, 115 S. Ct. at 389.
241. Banner MaU, 114S. Ct. at 1367.
242. Id. at 1368.
243. Bonner Ma, 115 S. Ct. at 393.
244. Id. at 392.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 393.
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ing the appellate court's decision.247 Finally, the Court found it
impossible to predict whether routine vacatur would produce
significant judicial economies. 248
Justice Scalia's opinion, however, left an opening for the continued
use of vacatur upon settlement, by stating that its holding does "not
... say that vacatur can never be granted when mootness is produced
[by settlement]."249 He stressed that the "determination is an
equitable one," and noted that vacatur might be appropriate in
exceptional circumstances." 0 Discussing in dictum appellate court
vacatur of district courtjudgments, the Court intimated that the same
equitable considerations would apply."1 Bonner Mall makes clear
that the "mere fact that the settlement agreement provides for
vacatur" is insufficient. 2
What remains in doubt is the nature of the "exceptional circum-
stances" that petitioner must show to justify vacatur.253 Routine
vacatur by the courts of appeals upon settlement presumably cannot
stand after Bonner Mall Whether the Ninth Circuit's balancing
test- 4 is sufficient to account for the equitable considerations laid
out in Bonner Mall is open to debate.25-
Bonner Mall is silent on the question of the remaining value (if any)
of a vacated opinion.255  The matter at issue in Bonner
Mall-whether the new value exemption to the absolute priority rule
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Vacatur cases not involving settlement further illuminate the Supreme Court's concerns.
In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Internationa4 for example, the Court rejected the Federal
Circuit's routine practice of vacating ajudgment of patent invalidity when it upheld a finding
that the patent was not infringed. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, 113 S. Ct. 1967 (1993).
The alleged infringer, Morton, prevailed below both on the infringement claim and on its
counterclaim that the patents at issue were invalid. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
finding of noninfringement but vacated thejudgment that the patent was invalid, believing that
it was unnecessary to decide the validity of the patent if it had not been infringed. The
Supreme Court found little merit in the Federal Circuit's approach, noting that it leads to the
"wasteful consequences of relitigating the validity of a patent after it has once been held invalid
in a fair trial." Id. at 1977. Vacatur "denies the patentee... appellate review, prolongs the life
of invalid patents, [and] encourages endless litigation (or at least uncertainty) over the validity
of outstanding patents." Id. at 1978. It also prevents the successful litigant from "preserving the
value of a declaratoryjudgment that... 'it obtained on a valid counterclaim at great effort and
expense.'" Id. at 1976 (quoting Morton Int'l v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 967 F.2d 1571, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (Nies, C.J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc)).
256. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 386.
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survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code-is far from
settled. 7 The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Bonner Mall made new law
for that jurisdiction on this issue, and provided guidance to parties
and lower courts within its boundaries. The effect of vacatur in this
case would have been to return the law of the Ninth Circuit to a more
uncertain status, particularly if the Ninth Circuit's opinion is deemed,
after vacatur, to have no remaining precedential or persuasive value.
Vacatur diminishes the predictive value of past decisions and leaves
the law in a state of profound uncertainty. Moreover, vacatur upon
settlement may allow certain categories of litigants to "rig" the
common law,258 and may reduce the role of the courts to merely
"validat[ing] the wishes of the parties before them." 9 Viewed in
this manner, court approval of vacatur upon settlement compromises
the notion that decisions should be based on law, not on the status
or resources of the parties. The lack of clarity surrounding the
precedential value of unpublished opinions, summary dispositions,
and opinions vacated upon settlement undermines the values of
certainty, stability, and fidelity to law.
C. Lack of Guidance for Future Decisions
Perhaps the most troublesome manner in which selective publica-
tion, summary dispositions, and vacatur weaken the development of
the law is their failure to provide guidance for future conduct and for
resolving future disputes. That is, even if a relevant decision can be
located, and its precedential value ascertained, it may provide
insufficient information about the facts of the case, the relevant rules,
and the reasoning behind the rules' application.26° Judges, no less
than attorneys, must be able to evaluate prior decisions based upon
a sophisticated understanding of what the court actually decided.
Failing to provide sufficient guidance for future decisions jeopardizes
the courts' ability to decide cases consistently and according to the
law.2 61
257. See, e.g., 4 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2D § 93.13 (William L. Norton,Jr.
ed., 1993) (articulating "several reasons to question" availability of exception, and collecting
cases).
258. See Roger Parloff, Rigging the Common Law, AM. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 74, 74 (discussing
effects ofvacatur on insurance litigation); see also Fisch, supra note 22, at 204-08; Saundra Torry,
When Decisions are Written in Disappearing Ink, WASH. POsTJuly 25, 1994, at F7 (discussing ability
of wealthy corporations and institutions to offer generous settlements to plaintiffs in exchange
for joining in motion to vacate).
259. Resnik, supra note 10, at 1528.
260. Fisch, supra note 22, at 204.
261. See Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3,8 (1987) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that
need for fairness and accuracy in courts' decisionmaking outweighs advantages of summarily
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Two examples illustrate the practical difficulties judges face in
applying summary dispositions and unpublished opinions. In Burgin
v. Henderson,262 a district judge dismissed the complaint, relying on
a previous, unreported decision that had been orally affirmed by the
Second Circuit.263 On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded Burgin
for a factual hearing.264 The appellate court stated that the ques-
tion was still open because its affirmance of the district judge's earlier
opinion was of no precedential value.265 Thus, even though affir-
mance indicates that the lower court reached the correct result in the
earlier case, it is impossible to know whether the lower court's analysis
was sound. In future cases the trial judge cannot rely with confidence
on the rationale previously employed.
While summary affirmances open the way for future relitigation of
the same question, summary reversals are even more troubling. In
such cases, the lower court receives no information about the nature
of its error. Each year, the courts of appeals summarily reverse a
substantial number of district court rulings in whole or in part. 6
It is reasonable to assume that federal district judges generally know
the law of the circuit and attempt to apply it faithfully. It strains the
imagination to think that district judges reached the wrong result in
hundreds of cases where the law was entirely clear and settled.267
In many of these reversals, the authorities must have been unclear,
conflicting, or unavailable to the districtjudge. In any event, it would
seem sensible, when district judges do err, for the courts of appeals
to provide an explanation to prevent future errors of the same
type.2  The courts of appeals should publish full opinions whenev-
disposing of cases without first reviewing full record below and entertaining supplemental briefs
on merits of case).
262. 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976) (describing facts and disposition of unreported case at
district court level).
263. Sekou v. Henderson, 495 F.2d 1367 (Table) (2d Cir. 1974), affg No. 73-CV-543
(N.D.N.Y. 1973). The judge was aware of the earlier unreported decision because he was its
author. See Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1976).
264. Burgin, 536 F.2d at 504.
265. Id. at 503.
266. See Nichols, supra note 17, at 925-26 (discussing rule in some circuits that panel must
publish reversals (including vacatur or modification of order below)); Songer et al., supra note
12, at 975-76 (finding 12% rate of reversal in Eleventh Circuit's unpublished decisions in 1986,
and noting that more than one-third of reversals by Eleventh Circuit that year were unpub-
lished). With respect to the guidance appellate decisions provide lower court judges, data on
unpublished opinions applies with equal force to summary dispositions, in which opinions are
neither prepared nor published.
267. See LLEVELLYN, supra note 79, at 8 ("If the proper outcome of the case were not really
a matter of doubt, how is it that an honest, competentjudge in the court of first instance could
decide it 'incorrectly'?").
268. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 9, at 610-11 (asserting that judicial accountability
demands publication of circuit court opinions reversing or admonishing district courtjudges).
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er they reverse the court below.
The case of Guam v. Yan 69 illustrates similar problems resulting
from selective publication. Yang was convicted of kidnapping and
first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and his conviction was affirmed
by the District Court of Guam, Appellate Division.27 Yang appealed
to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed, relying on two unpublished
decisions of the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam.27 1
Both of those decisions had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in
unpublished memorandum decisions. 72 Two members of the Ninth
Circuit panel considered it appropriate to rely on the Appellate
Division's prior decisions because the Guam courts had no rule
prohibiting the citation of their own unpublished decisions.273 In
their view, the court of appeals was bound to respect the Guam
court's determination of what constituted Guam's decisional law.274
The dissenting judge, conversely, believed that the Guam court had
relied not on its own prior unpublished decisions, but rather on the
Ninth Circuit's unpublished affirmances of those decisions. 271 In his
view, reliance on the unpublished affirmances was improper under
Ninth Circuit Rule 21(c), which prohibits citing or using unpublished
memorandum dispositions of that court.276 After a rehearing en
banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel decision, holding that the
Guam courts were not entitled to rely on unpublished Ninth Circuit
decisions, which have no precedential authority.277
District court judges, attempting to reach results warranted by the
law of the circuit, understandably search for and rely on any available
evidence of what the law is.278 If the court of appeals is willing to
269. 800 F.2d 945 (1986), withdrawn, 833 F.2d 1379 (1987), and reuld afterreh'g, 850 F.2d 507
(9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
270. See Guam v.Yang, 800 F.2d 945, 946 (1986), withdrau, 833 F.2d 1379 (1987), and rev'd
after rehjg, 850 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
271. Id. at947-48 (citing Guam v. Hilton, Cr. App. No. 82-00055A (D. Guam App. Div. 1984),
af d, 760 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1985); Guam v. Ignacio, Cr. App. No. 79-00036A (D. Guam App.
Div. 1980), affld, 673 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982)).
272. Guam v. Hilton, 760 F.2d 276 (Table) (9th Cir. 1985); Guam v. Ignacio, 673 F.2d 1339
(Table) (9th Cir. 1982).
273. Yang, 800 F.2d at 947 n.2 (noting lack of express prohibition in Guam's Appellate
Division Rules against citation to unpublished decisions).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 948 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (citing 9TH CiR. R. 21(c)).
277. Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
278: The frustration of district court judges with this dilemma is also evident in the Fourth
Circuit. There, several district courts openly continue to rely on unpublished decisions of the
court of appeals, despite that circuit's noncitation rule. See, e.g., Martin Oil Co. v. Philadelphia
Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1236, 1237 n.2 (N.D. W. Va. 1993) (determining that lack of Fourth
Circuit published opinion on point, material relevance of unpublished case, and provision of
copies of case to parties in action obviate need to follow circuit's noncitation rule); see also
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reach a decision, it should permit district courts to rely on that
decision in the future. District court judges cannot follow the law if
the appellate court refuses to explain what the law is or where the
lower court erred. By failing to provide sufficient guidance to lower
court judges, summary dispositions, selective publication practices,
and noncitation rules undermine certainty, predictability, and fidelity
to authority. These practices breed confusion about the relevance of
various statements from a court. Summary reversals and reversals
unaccompanied by published opinions compromise fidelity to law in
that they give no reason to support what seems a drastic action.
Moreover, they give the impression of arbitrary, cavalier action by the
appellate court and threaten confidence in the judicial process." 9
CONCLUSION
The common law's evolutionary development through case-by-case
adjudication yields an irregular and complex structure. The law is
difficult to know, and in many ways the most important aspects of the
"law" are its subtle contours and shadings of meaning. These features
are revealed not by the mere result of a case, but rather by the
analysis and explication of facts and reasons set forth in a published
opinion.
Only through thoughtful preparation of opinions can judges
demonstrate due consideration of each case. Only through publica-
tion of opinions in all potentially law-making decisions can the courts
secure the values of stability, certainty, predictability, consistency, and
fidelity to authority, which are essential to the vitality and legitimacy
of the judicial system. Because the courts of appeals are, in over
ninety-nine percent of the cases that reach them, courts of last
resort,"' they in particular have a special obligation to oversee the
development of a coherent body of law and to safeguard the
legitimacy of the judiciary. These obligations far outweigh the
caseload pressures that cause the courts of appeals to employ selective
publication, summary disposition, and vacatur upon settlement with
increasing frequency. When the courts of appeals change their
opinion writing and publishing practices, they imperil the develop-
ment of a coherent body of law, threaten the legitimacy of the federal
CARRINGTON El AL., supra note 43, at 37-38 n.16 (citing cases in which district courts have relied
on unpublished circuit court opinions).
279. See Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 8 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
detrimental effects of summary dispositions on confidence in judicial system).
280. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing grants of certiorari by U.S.
Supreme Court relative to number of appeals terminated by courts of appeals).
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courts and their acceptance in society, and frustrate the daily work of
judges and lawyers.
The courts of appeals should reevaluate the use of these practices.
Because it is so difficult to determine, at the time of the decision,
which opinions make law, the courts should operate under a strong
presumption favoring the preparation and publication of opin-
ions." This presumption would require publication except in truly
insignificant cases. Published opinions should accompany all cases
reversing the district court and all cases in which the panel's decision
is not unanimous.
Summary reversals should never be issued. The parties, the lower
court, and future litigants are entitled to an explanation of the error
below. The courts of appeals should limit summary affirmances to
cases in which a published opinion below adequately states the
grounds of the decision, and then the appellate court should state
explicitly that it affirms both the result and the reasoning of the court
below. When a court of appeals endorses the reasoning of an
unpublished district court opinion, it should order publication of the
district court opinion as an appendix to its summary affirmance order.
If it does not endorse the reasoning of the district court, the appellate
court should prepare and publish a full opinion.
Vacatur at the request of the parties should be granted only upon
an express written determination by the court that the value of
vacatur in promoting settlement outweighs the public interest in
maintaining certainty and finality in the law. The courts of appeals
should assiduously guard against the impression that parties may
procure the erasure of unfavorable precedents. Even assuming that
the availability of vacatur encourages settlement prior to appeal, this
benefit does not justify a practice that retards the development of a
coherent body of law and gives the appearance of unfairness.
These recommendations reflect the principle that all "law-making"
opinions should be published. They recognize the courts of appeals'
obligations to oversee the coherent development of the law and to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process. While these recommen-
281. Courts may be able to achieve some measure of efficiency by altering the format of their
opinions. The format of opinions is a separate question from the determination whether or not
to publish. Numerous commentators, including judges, have suggested that an abbreviated
opinion format, which recited briefly the facts and issues involved, as well as the court's
reasoning, would promote certainty, consistency, predictability, and fidelity to authority. See, e.g.,
CARRINGTON Er AL., supra note 43, at 33-35 (discussing proposal for abbreviated memorandum
opinion); POSNER, supra note 42, at 230-32 (describing excessive length of federal appellate
opinions and overuse of footnotes); Wald, supra note 105, at 782 (discussing abridged memoran-
dum decisions). At the same time, these abbreviated opinions should conserve judge's time and
lessen the "swelling" of the law.
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dations would increase the rate of opinion publication, they admit
that opinions need not be published in frivolous appeals or cases
where the law is truly well-settled.
The courts of appeals' admittedly legitimate concerns with
increasing caseloads do not warrant practices that threaten the
development of a coherent body of law and fundamentally alter our
appellate traditions. Rather than adopting practices that strike at the
very core of their function in our legal system, the courts of appeals
should pursue structural or other reforms to address the caseload
crisis. Appellate court practices that create a "secret" body of law of
questionable precedential value, and that provide wholly inadequate
guidance to district court judges, lawyers, and citizens, are misguided
and destructive. Selective publication, summary dispositions, and
vacatur upon settlement worsen, rather than improve, the situation.
